06220oam 22015614 450 991095586210332120250426110940.0978661387373697814623456181462345611978145279946914527994669781283561280128356128X97814519202841451920288(CKB)3360000000445091(EBL)3012511(SSID)ssj0001478958(PQKBManifestationID)11781068(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001478958(PQKBWorkID)11471926(PQKB)11741419(OCoLC)535146898(IMF)WPIEE2352004(MiAaPQ)EBC3012511(IMF)WPIEA2352004WPIEA2352004(EXLCZ)99336000000044509120020129d2004 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrManaging Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs /Ashoka Mody, Se-Jik Kim1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2004.1 online resource (29 p.)IMF Working Papers"December 2004."9781451875683 1451875681 Includes bibliographical references (p. 27-28).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. THE BASIC MODEL""; ""III. SIMULTANEOUS VERSUS SEQUENTIAL LIQUIDITY SHORTAGES""; ""IV. EARLY VERSUS LATE BAILOUTS""; ""V. POLITICAL ECONOMY""; ""VI. EXTENSIONS""; ""VII. CONCLUSIONS""; ""References""In a rational-expectations framework, we model depositors' confidence as a function of the probability of future bank bailouts. We analyze the effect of alternative bank bailout policies on depositors' confidence in an emerging market setting, where liquidity shortages of banks are revealed sequentially and governments cannot credibly commit to bailing out all potentially distressed banks. Our findings suggest that allowing early bank failures and using available liquidity for credible commitments to later bailouts can better boost confidence than early bailouts. This conclusion arises because with a high chance of liquidity shortage in the future, depositors may lose confidence and hence withdraw deposits even from potentially sound banks. Such a policy of late bailouts is likely to receive political support when a full bailout needs to be financed by taxation. The logic of late bailout remains valid even when banks may hide their distress or when closures of early distressed banks create contagion.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2004/235Bank failuresDeveloping countriesEconometric modelsLiquidity (Economics)Developing countriesEconometric modelsAsset and liability managementimfBank bailoutsimfBankingimfBanks and BankingimfBanks and bankingimfBanksimfBlanket guaranteeimfCapital and Ownership StructureimfConsumptionimfCrisis managementimfDepository InstitutionsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfEconomicsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial crisesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial regulation and supervisionimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfFinancial risk managementimfFinancial services law & regulationimfFinancing PolicyimfGoodwillimfInvestment DecisionsimfLiquidity riskimfLiquidityimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfNational accountsimfPortfolio ChoiceimfSavingimfValue of FirmsimfWealthimfKorea, Republic ofimfBank failuresEconometric models.Liquidity (Economics)Econometric models.Asset and liability managementBank bailoutsBankingBanks and BankingBanks and bankingBanksBlanket guaranteeCapital and Ownership StructureConsumptionCrisis managementDepository InstitutionsEconomic & financial crises & disastersEconomicsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial crisesFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial regulation and supervisionFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementFinancial Risk ManagementFinancial risk managementFinancial services law & regulationFinancing PolicyGoodwillInvestment DecisionsLiquidity riskLiquidityMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesNational accountsPortfolio ChoiceSavingValue of FirmsWealthMody Ashoka888386Kim Se-Jik1623190International Monetary Fund.European Dept.International Monetary Fund.Research Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910955862103321Managing Confidence in Emerging Market Bank Runs4371316UNINA