05539oam 22012614 450 991095517180332120250426110725.0978661284051797814623669031462366902978145270267414527026759781451869576145186957697812828405151282840517(CKB)3170000000054995(EBL)1607825(SSID)ssj0000943964(PQKBManifestationID)11523999(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943964(PQKBWorkID)10983189(PQKB)11180517(OCoLC)874176086(MiAaPQ)EBC1607825(IMF)WPIEE2008096(IMF)WPIEA2008096WPIEA2008096(EXLCZ)99317000000005499520020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrAccumulating Foreign Reserves Under Floating Exchange Rates /Fernando M. Gonçalves1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (43 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/96Description based upon print version of record.9781451914115 1451914113 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical Model: Basic Set-up; 3. Complete Information; 3.1. Centralization; 3.2. Institutional Arrangements in Practice; 3.3. Separation; 3.4. Centralization versus Separation; 4. Incomplete Information; 4.1. Stage 1: Centralization versus Separation; Figures; 1. Timetable; 4.2. Stage 0: Centralization versus Separation; 5. Comparative Analysis Under Incomplete Information; 5.1. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 2. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 5.2. The Trade-off Between Reserve Accumulation and Credibility Building; 5.3. Centralization versus Separation5.3.1. Macroeconomic Stability3. Macroeconomic Stability - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.2. Reserve Targeting; 4. Reserve Targeting - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.3. Discussion; 6. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 1; Proof of Corollary 1Official accumulation of foreign reserves may be perceived as interventions to influence the exchange rate, undermining the credibility of floating exchange rates and inflation targets. This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between reserve accumulation and monetary policy. The model uncovers a trade-off between the speed of reserve accumulation and anti-inflationary credibility. Under reasonable assumptions, delegation of intervention and monetary policy decisions to separate government agencies allows faster reserve accumulation, while centralization of these decisions results in a more stable economy. The analysis underscores the importance of rather overlooked institutional features of policymaking in open economies.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/096Foreign exchange ratesEconometric modelsBank reservesEconometric modelsMonetary policyEconometric modelsBankingimfBanks and BankingimfCurrencyimfDeflationimfForeign exchange interventionimfForeign exchange reservesimfForeign ExchangeimfForeign exchangeimfInflation targetingimfInflationimfInstitutional arrangements for revenue administrationimfMacroeconomicsimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary PolicyimfMonetary policyimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfPrice LevelimfPricesimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfReserves accumulationimfRevenueimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfForeign exchange ratesEconometric models.Bank reservesEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.BankingBanks and BankingCurrencyDeflationForeign exchange interventionForeign exchange reservesForeign ExchangeForeign exchangeInflation targetingInflationInstitutional arrangements for revenue administrationMacroeconomicsMonetary economicsMonetary PolicyMonetary policyMoney and Monetary PolicyPrice LevelPricesPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceReserves accumulationRevenueTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: General332.456Gonçalves Fernando M862010DcWaIMFBOOK9910955171803321Accumulating Foreign Reserves Under Floating Exchange Rates4371308UNINA