02850nam 2200625Ia 450 991095449170332120251116210020.01-282-55509-X97866125550910-253-00419-5(CKB)2560000000012926(OCoLC)613205851(CaPaEBR)ebrary10383937(SSID)ssj0000412530(PQKBManifestationID)11306641(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000412530(PQKBWorkID)10367338(PQKB)11599573(MiAaPQ)EBC516826(MdBmJHUP)muse17043(Au-PeEL)EBL516826(CaPaEBR)ebr10383937(CaONFJC)MIL255509(BIP)46202689(BIP)27111193(EXLCZ)99256000000001292620090828d2010 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrThe battle for Western Europe, Fall 1944 an operational assessment /John A. AdamsBloomington Indiana University Press20101 online resource (388 p.) Twentieth-century battlesBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-253-35435-8 Includes bibliographical references and index.Culmination -- Logistics -- SHAEF's plan -- It wasn't Arnhem versus Antwerp -- Concentrate, General Bradley -- Patton's Lorraine campaign -- November rerun -- Opportunity in the South -- Conclusion : unity of command.This engrossing and meticulously researched volume reexamines the decisions made by Dwight D. Eisenhower and his staff in the crucial months leading up to the Battle of the Bulge. In late August 1944 defeat of the Wehrmacht seemed assured. On December 16, however, the Germans counterattacked. Received wisdom says that Eisenhower s Broad Front strategy caused his armies to stall in early September, and his subsequent failure to concentrate his forces brought about deadlock and opened the way for the German attack. Arguing to the contrary, John A. Adams demonstrates that Eisenhower and his staff at SHAEF had a good campaign strategy, refined to reflect developments on the ground, which had an excellent chance of destroying the Germans west of the Rhine."Twentieth-century battles.World War, 1939-1945CampaignsWestern FrontHistory, Modern20th centuryWorld War, 1939-1945CampaignsHistory, Modern940.54/21Adams John A.1949-1870159MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910954491703321The battle for Western Europe, Fall 19444478518UNINA