00738nam0-22002651i-450-99000351691040332120001010000351691FED01000351691(Aleph)000351691FED0100035169120000920d1962----km-y0itay50------baitay-------001yy<<The >>human factor in changing Africa.M. Herskovits.New Yorks.e.1962Herskovits,Melville Jean<1895-1963>206270ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990003516910403321SE 02.09.028-028391DECSEDECSEHuman factor in changing Africa497922UNINAING0107326oam 22015374 450 991095855530332120250426110912.0978146398626114639862629781463949525146394952997814639409971463940998(CKB)2670000000184980(EBL)1606540(SSID)ssj0000941791(PQKBManifestationID)11498812(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941791(PQKBWorkID)10964434(PQKB)11233022(Au-PeEL)EBL1606540(CaPaEBR)ebr10553701(OCoLC)870244936(IMF)WPIEE2012029(IMF)WPIEA2012029(MiAaPQ)EBC1606540WPIEA2012029(EXLCZ)99267000000018498020020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBank Funding Structures and Risk : Evidence From the Global Financial Crisis /Pablo Federico, Francisco Vazquez1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (35 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.9781463933142 1463933142 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Empirical Hypotheses; III. Data and Target Variables; A. Indicators of Bank Liquidity and Leverage; B. Global Banks Versus Domestic Banks; C. Bank Failure; IV. Empirical Approach and Quantitative Results; A. Stylized Facts; B. Baseline Regressions; C. Are There Threshold Effects at Play?; D. Are There Differences Across Bank Types?; V. Robustness Check; VI. Concluding Remarks; VII. References; Figures; 1. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage Before the Crisis, 2001-072. Evolution of Structural Liquidity and Leverage by Failed and Non-Failed Banks3. Distributions of Pre-Crisis Liquidity and Leverage across Failed and Non-Failed; Tables; 1. Stylized Balance-Sheet and Weights to Compute the NSFR; 2. Sample Coverage by Region and Type; 3. Summary Statistics of Selected Variables, 2001-07; 4. Pairwise Correlations Between Selected Variables, 2001-07; 5. Baseline Regressions; 6. Estimates of the Marginal Impact on the Probabilities of Default; 7. Probit Regressions by Sub-Samples of Liquidity and Leverage; 8. Regressions by Bank Types9. Results of Robustness Checks by Alternative Definitions of Liquidity and CapitalTable 10. Results of Robustness Checks by Sub-Components of Bank FailureThis paper analyzes the evolution of bank funding structures in the run up to the global financial crisis and studies the implications for financial stability, exploiting a bank-level dataset that covers about 11,000 banks in the U.S. and Europe during 2001?09. The results show that banks with weaker structural liquidity and higher leverage in the pre-crisis period were more likely to fail afterward. The likelihood of bank failure also increases with bank risk-taking. In the cross-section, the smaller domestically-oriented banks were relatively more vulnerable to liquidity risk, while the large cross-border banks were more susceptible to solvency risk due to excessive leverage. The results support the proposed Basel III regulations on structural liquidity and leverage, but suggest that emphasis should be placed on the latter, particularly for the systemically-important institutions. Macroeconomic and monetary conditions are also shown to be related with the likelihood of bank failure, providing a case for the introduction of a macro-prudential approach to banking regulation.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/029Global Financial Crisis, 2008-2009Bank failuresDeveloped countriesBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfInvestments: StocksimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPortfolio ChoiceimfInvestment DecisionsimfFinancial CrisesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: GeneralimfPension FundsimfNon-bank Financial InstitutionsimfFinancial InstrumentsimfInstitutional InvestorsimfBankingimfFinanceimfFinancial services law & regulationimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfInvestment & securitiesimfLiquidity requirementsimfLiquidityimfFinancial crisesimfDistressed institutionsimfFinancial regulation and supervisionimfAsset and liability managementimfFinancial institutionsimfStocksimfBanks and bankingimfState supervisionimfEconomicsimfFinancial services industryimfUnited StatesimfGlobal Financial Crisis, 2008-2009.Bank failuresBanks and BankingFinance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementIndustries: Financial ServicesInvestments: StocksFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPortfolio ChoiceInvestment DecisionsFinancial CrisesFinancial Institutions and Services: GeneralPension FundsNon-bank Financial InstitutionsFinancial InstrumentsInstitutional InvestorsBankingFinanceFinancial services law & regulationEconomic & financial crises & disastersInvestment & securitiesLiquidity requirementsLiquidityFinancial crisesDistressed institutionsFinancial regulation and supervisionAsset and liability managementFinancial institutionsStocksBanks and bankingState supervisionEconomicsFinancial services industry332.1/52Federico Pablo1816484Vazquez Francisco395343DcWaIMFBOOK9910958555303321Bank Funding Structures and Risk4372591UNINA06263nam 22006855 450 991086656710332120250807152953.09783031540714(electronic bk.)978303154070710.1007/978-3-031-54071-4(MiAaPQ)EBC31497579(Au-PeEL)EBL31497579(CKB)32320332400041(DE-He213)978-3-031-54071-4(OCoLC)1441719785(EXLCZ)993232033240004120240619d2024 u| 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierStochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints /by Serdar Yüksel, Tamer Başar1st ed. 2024.Cham :Springer Nature Switzerland :Imprint: Birkhäuser,2024.1 online resource (935 pages)Systems & Control: Foundations & Applications,2324-9757Print version: Yüksel, Serdar Stochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2024 9783031540707 Introduction -- Part I: Stochastic Teams and a Mathematical Theory of Information Structures -- An Introduction to Stochastic Team Theory and Solutions to Static Teams -- Information Structures in Decentralized Stochastic Control -- Existence, Structure, and Approximations to Optimality: Strategic Measures in Decentralized Stochastic Control -- Control Policy Topologies and Dynamic Programming Methods in Decentralized Stochastic Control -- Many-Agent Convex and Non-Convex Exchangeable (Mean-Field) Teams and Optimality of Symmetric Policies -- Comparison of Information Structures and Their Blackwell Ordering -- Continuity, Existence, and Topological Properties of Optimal Cost on the Space of Information Structures -- Part II: Stochastic Game Theory and Information Structures -- An Introduction to Stochastic Game Theory -- Information Structures in Stochastic Dynamic Games, Equilibrium Concepts, and Informational Properties -- Information Structure Dependent Properties: Existence, Comparison, Continuity of Equilibria and Team-against-Team Games -- Part III: Information Design via Information Theory in Networked Systems and Control -- Coding for Control and Connections with Information Theory -- Stochastic Stabilization of Linear Systems under Information Constraints -- Stochastic Stabilization of Non-Linear Systems: Information Theoretic versus Stochastic Geometric Analysis -- Optimal Real-Time Coding and Control under Information Constraints: Structural and Existence Results -- Optimal LQG Coding and Control: Separation Results, Information Theoretic Methods, and Optimality of Linear Policies -- Optimal Coding under Small Estimation Error and Observability Criteria -- Part IV: Information and Signaling Games -- Signaling Games: Equilibria under Misaligned Criteria or Mismatched Priors between an Encoder and a Decoder -- Two Classes of Signaling Games: Reputation and Information Privacy Games -- Zero-Sum Information Games: Jamming and Witsenhausen's Counterexample as a Game -- Appendix A:Topological Notions and Optimizations -- Appendix B: Probability Theory and Stochastic Processes -- Appendix C: On Spaces of Probability Measures -- Appendix D: Markov Chains, Martingales, and Ergodic Processes -- Appendix E: Markov Decision Theory and Optimality of Markov Policies -- Appendix F: Stochastic Stability of Markov Chains and Random-Time State-Dependent Stochastic Drift -- Appendix G: Topological and Metric Entropy in Dynamical Systems.This monograph presents a mathematically rigorous and accessible treatment of the interaction between information, decision, control, and probability in single-agent and multi-agent systems. The book provides a comprehensive and unified theory of information structures for stochastic control, stochastic teams, stochastic games, and networked control systems. Part I of the text is concerned with a general mathematical theory of information structures for stochastic teams, leading to systematic characterizations and classifications, geometric and topological properties, implications on existence, approximations and relaxations, their comparison, and regularity of optimal solutions in information. Information structures in stochastic games are then considered in Part II, and the dependence of equilibrium solutions and behavior on information is demonstrated. Part III studies information design through information theory in networked control systems – both linear and nonlinear – and discusses optimality and stability criteria. Finally, Part IV introduces information and signaling games under several solution concepts, with applications to prior mismatch, cost mismatch and privacy, reputation games and jamming. This text will be a valuable resource for researchers and graduate students interested in control theory, information theory, statistics, game theory, and applied mathematics. Readers should be familiar with the basics of linear systems theory, stochastic processes, and Markov chains.Systems & Control: Foundations & Applications,2324-9757System theoryControl theoryGame theoryCoding theoryInformation theoryAutomatic controlSystems Theory, ControlGame TheoryCoding and Information TheoryControl and Systems TheorySystem theory.Control theory.Game theory.Coding theory.Information theory.Automatic control.Systems Theory, Control.Game Theory.Coding and Information Theory.Control and Systems Theory.003Yüksel Serdar768245Başar Tamer282101MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQ9910866567103321Stochastic Teams, Games, and Control under Information Constraints4270372UNINA