05430oam 22011294 450 991082909270332120240402044953.01-4623-0025-11-4519-6223-11-282-84527-61-4527-0868-19786612845277(CKB)3170000000055419(SSID)ssj0000943053(PQKBManifestationID)11523873(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943053(PQKBWorkID)10975309(PQKB)11519156(OCoLC)502478206(MiAaPQ)EBC1606075(IMF)WPIEE2010018(EXLCZ)99317000000005541920020129d2010 uf 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrResponding to Banking Crises : Lessons From Cross-Country Evidence /Enrica Detragiache, Giang Ho1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2010.31 pIMF Working PapersBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph1-4519-1867-4 Includes bibliographical references.Intro -- Contents -- I. Introduction -- II. Methodology and Data -- A. Empirical Model -- B. Policy Response Index -- C. Control Variables -- D. The Instrument -- III. The Results -- A. Results from Baseline Specification -- B. Comparison with Other Results in the Literature -- C. Sensitivity Analysis: Additional Controls -- D. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- E. Sensitivity Analysis: Alternative Policy Response Indexes -- F. Fiscal Policy during the Crisis. -- IV. Conclusions -- References -- Text Tables -- 1. Correlation among Crisis Performance Measures -- 2. Construction of the Policy Index -- 3. Crisis Episodes, Policy Response, and Political System -- 4. Cross-Correlations between Political System and Crisis Policies -- 5. Baseline Results -- 6. Additional Control Variables -- 7. Alternative Measures of Crisis Performance -- 8. Alternative Policy Indexes -- 9. Fiscal Policy Response and Political System -- Figure 1. Distribution of Policy Index -- Appendix Tables -- A1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources -- A2. Summary Statistics -- A3. Cross Correlations among Variables.A common legacy of banking crises is a large increase in government debt, as fiscal resources are used to shore up the banking system. Do crisis response strategies that commit more fiscal resources lower the economic costs of crises? Based on evidence from a sample of 40 banking crises we find that the answer is negative. In fact, policies that are riskier for the government budget are associated with worse, not better, post-crisis performance. We also show that parliamentary political systems are more prone to adopt bank rescue measures that are costly for the government budget. We take advantage of this relationship to instrument the policy response, thereby addressing concerns of joint endogeneity. We find no evidence that endogeneity is a source of bias.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2010/018Financial crisesBanks and bankingBanks and BankingimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfPublic FinanceimfFinancial Markets and the MacroeconomyimfCentral Banks and Their PoliciesimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfFinancial CrisesimfCrisis ManagementimfFiscal PolicyimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfBankingimfMacroeconomicsimfFinancial crisesimfBanking crisesimfCrisis resolutionimfCrisis managementimfFiscal policyimfBanks and bankingimfArgentinaimfFinancial crises.Banks and banking.Banks and BankingFinancial Risk ManagementPublic FinanceFinancial Markets and the MacroeconomyCentral Banks and Their PoliciesBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationFinancial CrisesCrisis ManagementFiscal PolicyEconomic & financial crises & disastersBankingMacroeconomicsFinancial crisesBanking crisesCrisis resolutionCrisis managementFiscal policyBanks and banking338.29125Detragiache Enrica120810Ho Giang1604260International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910829092703321Responding to Banking Crises3929040UNINA