03848nam 2200625Ia 450 991082855730332120200520144314.01-4623-6989-81-4527-6116-71-282-84338-91-4518-7271-29786612843389(CKB)3170000000055280(EBL)1608322(SSID)ssj0000940826(PQKBManifestationID)11519300(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940826(PQKBWorkID)10955497(PQKB)10572487(OCoLC)550640858(IMF)WPIEE2009124(MiAaPQ)EBC1608322(EXLCZ)99317000000005528020041202d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFiscal incentive effects of the German equalization system /prepared by Sven Jari Stehn and Annalisa Fedelino1st ed.[Washington D.C.] International Monetary Fund20091 online resource (31 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/09/124Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1700-7 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Fiscal Discipline and Fiscal Transfers: A Difficult Nexus; Figures; 1. Subnational Shares in Total Spending and Revenue, 2006; 2. Comparative Composition of Subnational Revenue; A. Germany's Transfer System; 3. Net Contributing and Net Receiving Länder; 4. Evolution of the Transfer System; B. Potential Implications of Transfers; 5. Debt by Government Level; 6: Länder Debt; III. Framework, Methodology, and Data; A. The Inter-Temporal Budget Constraint; B. Cyclicality; C. Data; IV. Empirical Analysis; Tables; 1. Germany: Descriptive Statistics, 1985-2007A. Univariate Analysis: Fiscal Reaction Functions2. Fiscal Behavior of the Old Länder, 1985-2007; 3. Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; 4. Robustness Check I: Behavior of Primary Expenditure for Länder, 1985-2007; B. Multivariate Analysis: VARs; 5. Robustness Check II: Behavior of Primary Expenditure; 7. Länder Behavior and Average Received Transfers, 1985-2007; 8. Output Gap Shock; V. Policy Implications and Conclusions; 9. Primary Spending Shock; Appendix I; Appendix Table 6: Unit root tests; ReferencesDoes reliance on transfers weaken fiscal discipline and encourage pro-cyclical fiscal policies in recipient subnational governments? Using fiscal reaction functions for a panel of the German Länder, this paper finds a positive answer to both questions. Net-recipient states (Länder, benefiting from the transfer system) have not reduced primary expenditure significantly in response to rising deficits, but have instead relied on vertical transfers from the federal government to ensure debt sustainability. Moreover, they have pursued pro-cyclical policies, particularly by raising expenditures in good times. Net-contributing Länder (paying into the transfer system), in contrast, have ensured fiscal sustainability through spending adjustments; they have also been less pro-cyclical. Panel vector auto-regressions confirm these findings.IMF working paper ;WP/09/124.Intergovernmental fiscal relationsGermanyFiscal policyGermanyIntergovernmental fiscal relationsFiscal policy332.1/52Stehn Sven Jari1610665Fedelino Annalisa1603458MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910828557303321Fiscal Incentive Effects of the German Equalization System4117274UNINA