03288nam 2200685Ia 450 991082833010332120200520144314.01-107-14913-41-280-51612-70-511-21479-00-511-21658-00-511-21121-X0-511-31536-80-511-48708-80-511-21298-4(CKB)1000000000353143(EBL)266599(OCoLC)171139012(SSID)ssj0000115338(PQKBManifestationID)11140872(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000115338(PQKBWorkID)10006319(PQKB)11333884(UkCbUP)CR9780511487088(MiAaPQ)EBC266599(Au-PeEL)EBL266599(CaPaEBR)ebr10131736(CaONFJC)MIL51612(OCoLC)144618558(EXLCZ)99100000000035314320040115d2004 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierBrute rationality normativity and human action /Joshua GertCambridge ;New York Cambridge20041 online resource (xiii, 230 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Cambridge studies in philosophyTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-03953-3 0-521-83318-3 Includes bibliographical references (p. 221-225) and index.What would an adequate theory of rationality be like? -- Practical rationality, morality, and purely justificatory reasons -- The criticism from internalism about practical reasons -- A functional role analysis of reasons -- Accounting for our actual normative judgments -- Fitting the view into the contemporary debate -- Two concepts of rationality -- Internalism and different kinds of reasons -- Brute rationality.This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.Cambridge studies in philosophy.Normativity (Ethics)Decision makingMoral and ethical aspectsNormativity (Ethics)Decision makingMoral and ethical aspects.128/.4Gert Joshua1655442MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910828330103321Brute rationality4007863UNINA