04506nam 2200733 450 991082759410332120230124191432.00-8014-5563-40-8014-5661-40-8014-5564-210.7591/9780801455643(CKB)2670000000606934(SSID)ssj0001461639(PQKBManifestationID)11790313(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001461639(PQKBWorkID)11471988(PQKB)11712188(StDuBDS)EDZ0001516683(MiAaPQ)EBC3138722(OCoLC)1080549026(MdBmJHUP)muse58312(DE-B1597)478227(OCoLC)905902789(OCoLC)979576893(DE-B1597)9780801455643(Au-PeEL)EBL3138722(CaPaEBR)ebr11040192(CaONFJC)MIL759714(OCoLC)922998516(EXLCZ)99267000000060693420150417h20152015 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrWaging war, planning peace U.S. noncombat operations and major wars /Aaron RapportIthaca, [New York] ;London, [England] :Cornell University Press,2015.©20151 online resourceCornell Studies in Security AffairsIncludes index.0-8014-5358-5 1-336-28428-5 Includes bibliographical references and index.Front matter --Contents --Acknowledgments --List of Abbreviations --Introduction: Ambitious Aims and Meager Plans --1. Strategic Assessment and Noncombat Operations --2. The Occupation of Germany --3. "Phase IV" and the Invasion of Iraq --4. An Occupation That Never Was: Korea, 1950 - 1951 --5. State Building during Escalation in Vietnam --Conclusion: Reviewing Theoretical and Policy Implications --Notes --IndexAs the U.S. experience in Iraq following the 2003 invasion made abundantly clear, failure to properly plan for risks associated with postconflict stabilization and reconstruction can have a devastating impact on the overall success of a military mission. In Waging War, Planning Peace, Aaron Rapport investigates how U.S. presidents and their senior advisers have managed vital noncombat activities while the nation is in the midst of fighting or preparing to fight major wars. He argues that research from psychology-specifically, construal level theory-can help explain how individuals reason about the costs of postconflict noncombat operations that they perceive as lying in the distant future. In addition to preparations for "Phase IV" in the lead-up to the Iraq War, Rapport looks at the occupation of Germany after World War II, the planned occupation of North Korea in 1950, and noncombat operations in Vietnam in 1964 and 1965. Applying his insights to these cases, he finds that civilian and military planners tend to think about near-term tasks in concrete terms, seriously assessing the feasibility of the means they plan to employ to secure valued ends. For tasks they perceive as further removed in time, they tend to focus more on the desirability of the overarching goals they are pursuing rather than the potential costs, risks, and challenges associated with the means necessary to achieve these goals. Construal level theory, Rapport contends, provides a coherent explanation of how a strategic disconnect can occur. It can also show postwar planners how to avoid such perilous missteps.Cornell studies in security affairs.POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International)bisacshUnited StatesArmed ForcesOperations other than warHistory20th centuryUnited StatesArmed ForcesOperations other than warHistory21st centuryUnited StatesArmed ForcesOperations other than warCase studiesUnited StatesHistory, Military20th centuryCase studiesUnited StatesHistory, Military21st centuryCase studiesPOLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International).355.4Rapport Aaron1696508MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910827594103321Waging war, planning peace4076503UNINA