05369oam 22013214 450 991082687680332120200520144314.01-4623-1248-91-4527-8647-X1-283-51558-X1-4519-0860-19786613828033(CKB)3360000000443731(EBL)3014528(SSID)ssj0000943068(PQKBManifestationID)11558966(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943068(PQKBWorkID)10975060(PQKB)11574660(OCoLC)694141232(MiAaPQ)EBC3014528(IMF)WPIEE2006064(IMF)WPIEA2006064(EXLCZ)99336000000044373120020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSovereign Insurance and Program Design : What is Optimal for the Sovereign? /Miguel Messmacher1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (30 p.)IMF Working Papers"March 2006."1-4518-6324-1 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. MORAL HAZARD AND SOVEREIGN INSURANCE""; ""III. BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE AND THE ROLE OF INSURANCE""; ""IV. AN ALTRUISTIC INSURER""; ""V. DEFAULT BY THE COUNTRY""; ""VI. CONCLUSIONS""; ""VII. DERIVATION OF THE RESULTS""; ""REFERENCES""The design of the optimal sovereign insurance contract is analyzed when: the sovereign chooses the contract; effort is not contractible; shocks are of uncertain magnitude; the sovereign can save; and the sovereign can default. Under these conditions: i) an ex ante premium leads to higher coverage; ii) the premium increases with the sovereign's incentive to take risks; iii) a deductible is chosen to limit moral hazard; iv) the deductible-to-support ratio is decreasing with the size of the realized shock; and v) the change in the choice of savings when insurance is available is ambiguous, as there is a trade-off between inducing higher effort and increasing the likelihood of default.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/064InsuranceEconometric modelsMoral hazardEconometric modelsInternational financeEconometric modelsActuarial StudiesimfConsumptionimfEconomicsimfFinanceimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial InstrumentsimfFinancial risk managementimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfInstitutional InvestorsimfInsurance & actuarial studiesimfInsurance CompaniesimfInsurance companiesimfInsuranceimfInternational Economic Order and IntegrationimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsimfInternational Policy Coordination and TransmissionimfMacroeconomicsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfMoral hazardimfNon-bank Financial InstitutionsimfPension FundsimfPublic finance & taxationimfSavingimfTax incentivesimfTaxationimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWealthimfInsuranceEconometric models.Moral hazardEconometric models.International financeEconometric models.Actuarial StudiesConsumptionEconomicsFinanceFinance: GeneralFinancial InstrumentsFinancial risk managementGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationIndustries: Financial ServicesInstitutional InvestorsInsurance & actuarial studiesInsurance CompaniesInsurance companiesInsuranceInternational Economic Order and IntegrationInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsInternational Monetary Arrangements and InstitutionsInternational Policy Coordination and TransmissionMacroeconomicsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionMoral hazardNon-bank Financial InstitutionsPension FundsPublic finance & taxationSavingTax incentivesTaxationTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWealthMessmacher Miguel1697144International Monetary Fund.IMF Institute.DcWaIMFBOOK9910826876803321Sovereign Insurance and Program Design4077616UNINA