05900oam 22011654 450 991078823630332120230721045645.01-4623-1443-01-4527-4000-31-282-84092-41-4518-6999-19786612840920(CKB)3170000000055044(EBL)1607898(SSID)ssj0000944137(PQKBManifestationID)11503325(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000944137(PQKBWorkID)10983369(PQKB)10193867(OCoLC)252901774(MiAaPQ)EBC1607898(IMF)WPIEE2008141(EXLCZ)99317000000005504420020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrHerd Behavior in Financial Markets : An Experiment with Financial Market Professionals /Marco Cipriani, Antonio GuarinoWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (30 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/141Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1452-0 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; A. Literature Review; II. The Theoreticalmodel; A. The model structure; B. Theoretical predictions; Figures; 1. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Buys; III. The Experiment and the Experimental Design; A. The experiment; B. Experimental design: the two treatments; 2. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a History of Sells; 3. Prices and Traders' Expectations after a Sell Followed by a History of Buys; IV. Results: Rationality, Herding and Contrarian Behavior; A. Treatment I; Tables; 1. Average behavior in Treatment I2. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment IB. Treatment II; 3. No trade in Treatment I; 4. Average behavior in Treatment II; V. Comparison with Previous Experimental Results; 5. Cascade trading behavior in Treatment II; 6. No trade in Treatment II; VI. Individual Behavior; 7. Percentage of decisions in accordance with the theoretical prediction at individual level.; VII. Conclusions; 8. Regressions of the level of rationality in the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis9. Regression of subjects' payoff at the end of the experiment on individual characteristics. P-values in parenthesis10. Regressions of participants' proportion of herding, contrarianism and no trading on the trader's dummy. Herd 1 and Contrarian 1 refer to Treatment I. Herd 2 and Contrarian 2 refer to Treatment II. P-values in parenthesis; ReferencesWe study herd behavior in a laboratory financial market with financial market professionals. We compare two treatments, one in which the price adjusts to the order flow so that herding should never occur, and one in which event uncertainty makes herding possible. In the first treatment, subjects herd seldom, in accordance with both the theory and previous experimental evidence on student subjects. A proportion of subjects, however, engage in contrarianism, something not accounted for by the theory. In the second treatment, the proportion of herding decisions increases, but not as much as theory suggests; moreover, contrarianism disappears altogether.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/141Capitalists and financiersPsychologyEconometric modelsInvestmentsDecision makingEconometric modelsCollective behaviorEconometric modelsExports and ImportsimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfGender StudiesimfEmpirical Studies of TradeimfInternational Financial MarketsimfEducation: GeneralimfEconomics of GenderimfNon-labor DiscriminationimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfInternational economicsimfFinanceimfEducationimfGender studies, gender groupsimfTrade balanceimfAsset valuationimfGenderimfSecurities marketsimfBalance of tradeimfAsset-liability managementimfSex roleimfCapital marketimfCapitalists and financiersPsychologyEconometric models.InvestmentsDecision makingEconometric models.Collective behaviorEconometric models.Exports and ImportsFinance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementGender StudiesEmpirical Studies of TradeInternational Financial MarketsEducation: GeneralEconomics of GenderNon-labor DiscriminationGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)International economicsFinanceEducationGender studies, gender groupsTrade balanceAsset valuationGenderSecurities marketsBalance of tradeAsset-liability managementSex roleCapital market330.12Cipriani Marco1485198Guarino Antonio305062DcWaIMFBOOK9910788236303321Herd Behavior in Financial Markets3704192UNINA02811nam 2200613Ia 450 991082645510332120230803032512.01-60344-751-2(CKB)3170000000046124(EBL)1132619(OCoLC)829459984(SSID)ssj0000832915(PQKBManifestationID)12372285(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000832915(PQKBWorkID)10935541(PQKB)10678682(MiAaPQ)EBC1132619(MdBmJHUP)muse26616(Au-PeEL)EBL1132619(CaPaEBR)ebr10667682(CaONFJC)MIL453326(EXLCZ)99317000000004612420120427d2013 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrCold days in hell[electronic resource] American POWs in Korea /William C. Latham Jr1st ed.College Station, Tex. Texas A&M University Press20131 online resource (338 p.)Williams-Ford Texas A&M University military history series ;no. 141Description based upon print version of record.1-60344-073-9 Includes bibliographical references and index.The summer soldiers -- The tide turns -- The death march -- The warning -- Home by Christmas -- The reservoir -- The deadly winter -- Spring 1951 -- The pilots' war -- Mutual suspicion -- The pawns -- Freedom and recrimination.Following the North Korean assault on the Republic of Korea in June of 1950, the invaders captured more than a thousand American soldiers and brutally executed hundreds more. American prisoners who survived their initial moments of captivity faced months of neglect, starvation, and brutal treatment as their captors marched them north toward prison camps in the Yalu River Valley.Cold Days in Hell provides a detailed account of their captivity and offers valuable insights into an ongoing issue: the conduct of prisoners in the hands of enemy captors and the rules that should gWilliams-Ford Texas A&M University military history series ;no. 141.Korean War, 1950-1953Prisoners and prisons, North KoreanPrisoners of warKorea (North)Prisoners of warUnited StatesKorean War, 1950-1953Prisoners and prisons, North Korean.Prisoners of warPrisoners of war951.904/27Latham William C(William Clark),1961-1657765MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910826455103321Cold days in hell4011354UNINA