03403nam 22006134a 450 991082561340332120240515174814.01-281-05230-297866110523000-08-047596-5(CKB)1000000000363896(EBL)293998(OCoLC)213298431(SSID)ssj0000107479(PQKBManifestationID)11124960(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000107479(PQKBWorkID)10014081(PQKB)11508603(Au-PeEL)EBL293998(CaPaEBR)ebr10185970(CaONFJC)MIL105230(MiAaPQ)EBC293998(PPN)170246043(EXLCZ)99100000000036389620011130d2002 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrAuction theory /Vijay Krishna1st ed.San Diego Academic Pressc20021 online resource (318 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-12-426297-X Includes bibliographical references (p. [289]-297) and index.Auction Theory; Contents; Preface; Chapter 1: Introduction; Part I: Single Object Auctions; Chapter 2: Private Value Auctions: A First Look; Chapter 3: The Revenue Equivalence Principle; Chapter 4: Qualifications and Extensions; Chapter 5: Mechanism Design; Chapter 6: Auctions with Interdependent Values; Chapter 7: The Revenue Ranking (""Linkage"") Principle; Chapter 8: Asymmetries and Other Complications; Chapter 9: Efficiency and the English Auction; Chapter 10: Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values; Chapter 11: Bidding Rings; Part II: Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 12: An Introduction to Multiple Object AuctionsChapter 13: Equilibrium and Efficiency with Private Values; Chapter 14: Some Revenue Considerations; Chapter 15: Sequential Sales; Chapter 16: Nonidentical Objects; Chapter 17: Multiple Objects and Interdependent Values; Part III: Appendices; Appendix A: Continuous Distributions; Appendix B: Stochastic Orders; Appendix C: Order Statistics; Appendix D: Affiliated Random Variables; Appendix E: Some Linear Algebra; Appendix F: Games of Incomplete Information; Appendix G: Existence of Equilibrium in First-Price Auctions; References; IndexThrough accessible, detailed examinations of themes central to auction theory, Vijay Krishna explores auctions and competitive bidding as games of incomplete information. His results on bidding strategies, efficiency, and revenue maximization, and his clear proofs for each proposition, make this book both the standard reference on auctions and the first source of authoritative information about multi-unit auctions. Well organized and featuring straightforward intuition, Auction Theory's depth and breadth lay bare the complexity and utility of this growing field.*The standard reAuctionsMathematical modelsGame theoryAuctionsMathematical models.Game theory.381.1701381.1701Krishna Vijay383824MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910825613403321Auction theory263819UNINA