04376nam 2200733Ia 450 991082560620332120200520144314.01-282-45859-097866124585901-4008-3198-910.1515/9781400831982(CKB)2550000000000339(EBL)483591(OCoLC)593215217(SSID)ssj0000335169(PQKBManifestationID)11273989(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000335169(PQKBWorkID)10273591(PQKB)11562403(MdBmJHUP)muse36653(DE-B1597)446650(OCoLC)979579138(DE-B1597)9781400831982(Au-PeEL)EBL483591(CaPaEBR)ebr10364747(CaONFJC)MIL245859(MiAaPQ)EBC483591(EXLCZ)99255000000000033920090512d2010 uy 0engur|||||||nn|ntxtccrBeyond the formalist-realist divide[electronic resource] the role of politics in judging /Brian Z. TamanahaCourse BookPrinceton, NJ Princeton University Pressc20101 online resource (265 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-691-14279-3 0-691-14280-7 Includes bibliographical references and index.Front matter --Contents --Acknowledgments --1. Introduction --Part One. The Legal Formalists --2. The Myth about Beliefs in the Common Law --3. The Myth about "Mechanical Jurisprudence" --4. The Holes in the Story about Legal Formalism --Part Two. The Legal Realists --5. Realism before the Legal Realists --6. A Reconstruction of Legal Realism --Part Three. Studies of Judging --7. The Slant in the "Judicial Politics" Field --8. What Quantitative Studies of Judging Have Found --Part Four. Legal Theory --9. The Emptiness of "Formalism" in Legal Theory --10. Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide --Afterword --Notes --IndexAccording to conventional wisdom in American legal culture, the 1870's to 1920's was the age of legal formalism, when judges believed that the law was autonomous and logically ordered, and that they mechanically deduced right answers in cases. In the 1920's and 1930's, the story continues, the legal realists discredited this view by demonstrating that the law is marked by gaps and contradictions, arguing that judges construct legal justifications to support desired outcomes. This often-repeated historical account is virtually taken for granted today, and continues to shape understandings about judging. In this groundbreaking book, esteemed legal theorist Brian Tamanaha thoroughly debunks the formalist-realist divide. Drawing from extensive research into the writings of judges and scholars, Tamanaha shows how, over the past century and a half, jurists have regularly expressed a balanced view of judging that acknowledges the limitations of law and of judges, yet recognizes that judges can and do render rule-bound decisions. He reveals how the story about the formalist age was an invention of politically motivated critics of the courts, and how it has led to significant misunderstandings about legal realism. Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide traces how this false tale has distorted studies of judging by political scientists and debates among legal theorists. Recovering a balanced realism about judging, this book fundamentally rewrites legal history and offers a fresh perspective for theorists, judges, and practitioners of law.JudgesUnited StatesJudicial processUnited StatesLawPolitical aspectsUnited StatesLawUnited StatesPhilosophyLegal formalism.Legal realism.JudgesJudicial processLawPolitical aspectsLawPhilosophy.347.73/14MG 70800rvkTamanaha Brian Z256838MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910825606203321Beyond the formalist-realist divide4007922UNINA