05630oam 22011894 450 991082475780332120200520144314.01-4755-7345-61-4755-9735-5(CKB)2550000001041548(EBL)1607090(SSID)ssj0000943241(PQKBManifestationID)11523885(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943241(PQKBWorkID)10975476(PQKB)11100227(Au-PeEL)EBL1607090(CaPaEBR)ebr10661239(OCoLC)820489716(IMF)WPIEE2012285(IMF)WPIEA2012285(MiAaPQ)EBC1607090(EXLCZ)99255000000104154820020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrPension Reforms in Japan /Kenichiro Kashiwase, Masahiro Nozaki, Kiichi Tokuoka1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (22 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4755-7680-3 1-4755-4431-6 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; Figures; 1. Japan: Population Aging in Japan and OECD Countries; 2. Japan: Social Security Spending; II. The Pension System and Past Reforms in Japan; 3. Japan: Public Pension System; 4. Japan: NP and EPI Pension Spending and Contributions, 2010-2100; Boxes; 1. Japan: How Does Macro Indexing Work?; III. Pension Reform Options to Reduce the Fiscal Burden; Tables; 1. Japan: Options to Reduce Government for Basic Pension; 2. Japan: Growth Impact of Pension Reform Options; A. Raise Pension Eligibility Age5. Japan: Life Expectancy after Pension Eligibility Age, 2000-20306. OECD Countries: Pension Eligibility Age and Life Expectancy in 2010 and 2030; B. Lower Replacement Ratio; 7. Pension Benefit Replacement Rate for Single Earner Couples; 3. Japan: Old-age Poverty in Japan and the Role of Pensions; C. Higher Contribution Rates; 8. Pension Contribution Rate, 2009; D. Reducing Preferential Treatments; IV. Conclusion; Appendices; I. Methodologies to Calculate Fiscal Savings from Reform Options; ReferencesThis paper analyzes various reform options for Japan’s public pension in light of large fiscal consolidation needs of the country. The most attractive option is to increase the pension eligibility age in line with high and rising life expectancy. This would have a positive effect on long-run economic growth and would be relatively fair in sharing the burden of fiscal adjustment between younger and older generations. Other attractive options include better targeting by “clawing back” a small portion of pension benefits from wealthy retirees, reducing preferential tax treatment of pension benefit incomes, and collecting contributions from dependent spouses of employees, who are currently eligible for pension benefits even though they make no contributions. These options, if implemented concurrently, could reduce the government annual subsidy and the government deficit by up to 1¼ percent of GDP by 2020.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/285PensionsJapanRetirement incomeJapanAggregate Factor Income DistributionimfAgingimfDemographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and ForecastsimfDemographyimfEconomics of the ElderlyimfEconomics of the HandicappedimfExpenditureimfFiscal PolicyimfIncomeimfLaborimfMacroeconomicsimfNational accountsimfNon-labor Market DiscriminationimfNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsimfPension reformimfPension spendingimfPensionsimfPopulation & demographyimfPopulation agingimfPopulation and demographicsimfPrivate PensionsimfPublic FinanceimfSocial Security and Public PensionsimfJapanimfPensionsRetirement incomeAggregate Factor Income DistributionAgingDemographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and ForecastsDemographyEconomics of the ElderlyEconomics of the HandicappedExpenditureFiscal PolicyIncomeLaborMacroeconomicsNational accountsNon-labor Market DiscriminationNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsPension reformPension spendingPensionsPopulation & demographyPopulation agingPopulation and demographicsPrivate PensionsPublic FinanceSocial Security and Public Pensions362.952Kashiwase Kenichiro1631982Nozaki Masahiro1718072Tokuoka Kiichi1649141DcWaIMFBOOK9910824757803321Pension Reforms in Japan4114761UNINA