03467nam 2200649Ia 450 991082036410332120200520144314.00-7914-8378-91-4237-4378-4(CKB)1000000000458767(OCoLC)76786420(CaPaEBR)ebrary10579098(SSID)ssj0000265194(PQKBManifestationID)11230559(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000265194(PQKBWorkID)10292933(PQKB)10020937(MiAaPQ)EBC3407675(OCoLC)63193418(MdBmJHUP)muse6244(Au-PeEL)EBL3407675(CaPaEBR)ebr10579098(DE-B1597)683920(DE-B1597)9780791483787(EXLCZ)99100000000045876720040227d2005 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrUnited we stand? divide-and-conquer politics and the logic of international hostility /Aaron Belkin1st ed.Albany State University of New York Pressc20051 online resource (172 p.) SUNY series in global politicsBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-7914-6343-5 Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-156) and index.Front Matter -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Regime Vulnerability and International Conflict -- Theory -- Coup Risk and Military Division: Hostility within the Armed Forces and Regime Survival -- A Theory of Counterbalancing as a Cause of International Conflict -- Data -- Regime Vulnerability, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict during the Cold War: A Quantitative Analysis -- Regime Vulnerability as a Cause of Counterbalancing in Syria in the Early 1970s -- When Dividing the Military Provides an Incentive for Conflict: Fragmented Military Forces and International Conflict in Shevardnadze’s Georgia -- Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Index -- SUNY series in Global PoliticsIt has long been assumed that leaders engage in international conflict to unify their followers—what is often called the "rally 'round the flag" hypothesis. Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this hypothesis does not always provide a compelling explanation of the relationship between domestic politics and international conflict. In United We Stand? Aaron Belkin shows that in one important realm, civil-military relations, leaders often prefer divisiveness over cohesion. When they feel domestically vulnerable, leaders use international conflict in order to create and exacerbate rivalries among their own military forces to lower the risk of a coup and to contribute to the consolidation and stability of the political order. Case studies include post-Soviet Georgia and Syria.SUNY series in global politics.International relationsConflict managementWorld politicsInternational relations.Conflict management.World politics.327.1/6Belkin Aaron1966-1615505MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910820364103321United we stand3945730UNINA