02515nam 2200637Ia 450 991082012320332120200520144314.00-19-773111-21-280-52508-80-19-536233-010.1093/oso/9780195064971.001.0001(CKB)1000000000408280(EBL)273090(OCoLC)476014691(SSID)ssj0000212063(PQKBManifestationID)11194500(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000212063(PQKBWorkID)10137347(PQKB)10509861(Au-PeEL)EBL273090(CaPaEBR)ebr10279470(CaONFJC)MIL52508(MiAaPQ)EBC273090(OCoLC)1406781711(StDuBDS)9780197731116(EXLCZ)99100000000040828019900227d1991 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe non-reality of free will /Richard DoubleNew York Oxford University Press19911 online resource (260 pages)Oxford scholarship onlineBibliography: p235-241. _ Includes index.Previously issued in print: 1990.0-19-506497-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-241) and index.Contents; 1 Introduction; 1. The Problem of the Reality of Free Will; 2. Definitions of Terms; 3. Overview of the Text; 2 A Compatibilist Account of Free Will; 3 Does Freedom Require Morality?; 4 Compatibilism and Moral Responsibility; 5 Free Will as an Exemplar Concept; 6 Meta-Compatibilism; 7 An Argument for Moral Non-Realism; 8 Troubles with Libertarianism; 9 Conclusion; NOTES; REFERENCES; INDEXThis monograph offers an argument concerning free will and moral responsibility which identifies hierarchical compatibilism - a view espoused by such philosophers as Neely, Watson, Levin and Dennett - as the most plausible account of free will.Oxford scholarship online.Free will and determinismResponsibilityFree will and determinism.Responsibility.123/.5Double Richard1124201MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910820123203321Non-reality of free-will3641406UNINA