03809nam 22007454a 450 991081993950332120200520144314.01-107-11943-X0-511-49084-40-511-04960-90-521-77174-90-511-17285-00-511-31082-X1-280-42949-60-511-15175-6(CKB)111056485622512(EBL)201914(OCoLC)475916272(SSID)ssj0000230900(PQKBManifestationID)11204226(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000230900(PQKBWorkID)10197741(PQKB)11706658(UkCbUP)CR9780511490842(MiAaPQ)EBC201914(Au-PeEL)EBL201914(CaPaEBR)ebr2000906(CaONFJC)MIL42949(EXLCZ)9911105648562251219991116d2000 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierPutting trust in the US budget federal trust funds and the politics of commitment /Eric M. Patashnik1st ed.Cambridge [England] ;New York Cambridge University Press20001 online resource (xiv, 231 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Theories of institutional designTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-77748-8 0-511-01678-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 205-225) and index.Introduction: trust funds and the politics of commitment -- Political transaction costs, feedback effects, and policy credibility -- Trust fund taxes vs. general fund taxes -- Social security -- Medicare -- Highways -- Airports -- Superfund -- Barriers to trust fund adoption: the failed cases of energy security and lead abatement -- Conclusions: The structure and normative challenge of promise-keeping.In the United States many important programs are paid from trust funds. At a time when major social insurance funds are facing insolvency, this book provided the first comprehensive study of this significant yet little-studied feature of the American welfare state. Equally importantly, the author investigates an enduring issue in democratic politics: can current officeholders bind their successors? By law, trust funds, which get most of their money from earmarked taxes, are restricted for specific uses. Patashnik asks why these structures were created, and how they have affected political dynamics. He argues that officeholders have used trust funds primarily to reduce political uncertainty, and bind distant futures. Based on detailed case studies of trust funds in a number of policy sectors, he shows how political commitment is a developmental process, whereby precommitments shape the content of future political conflicts. This book will be of interest to students of public policy, political economy and American political development.Theories of institutional design.Federal trust funds and the politics of commitmentPension trustsUnited StatesSocial securityUnited StatesInfrastructure (Economics)United StatesFinanceBudgetUnited StatesPension trustsSocial securityInfrastructure (Economics)Finance.Budget336.73Patashnik Eric M865798MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910819939503321Putting trust in the US budget4012134UNINA