02873nam 2200649 450 991081966600332120200520144314.00-8131-2775-00-8131-4849-9(CKB)3710000000333981(EBL)1915116(SSID)ssj0001401947(PQKBManifestationID)12540017(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001401947(PQKBWorkID)11351999(PQKB)10706826(OCoLC)900344332(MdBmJHUP)muse43895(Au-PeEL)EBL1915116(CaPaEBR)ebr11011643(CaONFJC)MIL690872(MiAaPQ)EBC1915116(EXLCZ)99371000000033398120150206h20012001 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe fallacies of Cold War deterrence and a new direction /Keith B. PayneLexington, Kentucky :The University Press of Kentucky,2001.©20011 online resource (240 p.)Description based upon print version of record.1-322-59590-9 0-8131-2207-4 Includes bibliographical references and index.Cold War deterrence theory and practice -- Why the Cold War deterrence framework is inadequate -- Cold War deterrence thought in the post-Cold War world -- The dilemma of popular usage and a new direction -- Testing the deterrence framework -- The new deterrence framework, evidence, and misplaced confidence -- Lessons of this case study.In 1938, Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain hoped that a policy of appeasement would satisfy Adolf Hitler's territorial appetite and structured British policy accordingly. This plan was a failure, chiefly because Hitler was not a statesman who would ultimately conform to familiar norms. Chamberlain's policy was doomed because he had greatly misjudged Hitler's basic beliefs and thus his behavior. U.S. Cold War nuclear deterrence policy was similarly based on the confident but questionable assumption that Soviet leaders would be rational by Washington's standards; they would behave reasonably whDeterrence (Strategy)Nuclear weaponsUnited StatesCold WarDeterrence (Strategy)History20th centuryUnited StatesMilitary policyDeterrence (Strategy)Nuclear weaponsCold War.Deterrence (Strategy)History355.02/17Payne Keith B.1687802MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910819666003321The fallacies of Cold War deterrence and a new direction4061564UNINA