02558nam 2200481 a 450 991081883770332120200520144314.097801980295020198029500(MiAaPQ)EBC7036351(CKB)24235115700041(MiAaPQ)EBC3051880(Au-PeEL)EBL3051880(CaPaEBR)ebr10085448(CaONFJC)MIL47212(OCoLC)922952511(EXLCZ)992423511570004119980716d1999 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierSocrates, pleasure, and value /George RudebuschNew York Oxford University Press1999xiii, 169 pIncludes bibliographical references (p. 147-152) and indexes.Intro -- Contents -- Note on Abbreviations and Text -- ONE: Introduction -- TWO: Plato's Aporetic Style -- THREE: Ethical Protagoreanism -- FOUR: Callicles' Hedonism -- FIVE: Callicles Refuted -- SIX: Death Is One of Two Things -- SEVEN: The Intrinsic Value of Sense Pleasure and Pain -- EIGHT: The Righteous Are Happy -- NINE: Does Socrates Consistently Hold the Sufficiency Thesis? -- TEN: How Socrates Can Make Both Pleasure and Virtue the Chief Good -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index of Passages -- General Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- Q -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y -- Z.In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good.Ethics, AncientPleasureHedonismEthics, Ancient.Pleasure.Hedonism.183/.2Rudebusch George1957-779655MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQ9910818837703321Socrates, Pleasure and Value1676692UNINA