05466oam 22012494 450 991081814820332120240402044607.01-4623-3158-097866128411561-282-84115-71-4519-8526-61-4518-7022-1(CKB)3170000000055062(EBL)1605826(SSID)ssj0000943259(PQKBManifestationID)11502960(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943259(PQKBWorkID)10977184(PQKB)11511886(OCoLC)451167897(IMF)WPIEE2008164(MiAaPQ)EBC1605826(EXLCZ)99317000000005506220020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrStrategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt /Sven Jari Stehn, David Vines1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (40 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/164Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1475-X Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. The Model; A. Consumers; B. Price Setting; C. Aggregate Demand and Fiscal Policy; D. The System; E. Social Welfare; F. Policy Objectives; G. Calibration; III.Solving for Optimal Policy; A. Cooperative Policy; B. Non-Cooperative Policy under Discretion; Tables; 1. Optimal policy simulations for a transitory cost-push shock; IV.Optimal Policy when Lump-Sum Taxes are Available; A. Cooperative Policy; 1. Commitment; Figures; 1. Dynamic responses to a transitory cost-push shock under optimal policy. .; 2. DiscretionWe analyse optimal discretionary games between a benevolent central bank and a myopic government in a New Keynesian model. First, when lump-sum taxes are available and public debt is absent, we show that a Nash game results in too much government spending and excessively high interest rates, while fiscal leadership reinstates the cooperative outcome under discretion. Second, we show that this familiar result breaks down when lump-sum taxes are unavailable. With government debt, the Nash equilibrium still entails too much public spending but leads to lower interest rates than the cooperative policy, because debt has to be adjusted back to its pre-shock level to ensure time consistency. A setup of fiscal leadership does not avoid this socially costly outcome. Imposing a debt penalty onto the myopic government under either Nash or fiscal leadership raises welfare substantially, while appointing a conservative central bank is less effective.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/164Expenditures, PublicEconometric modelsFiscal policyEconometric modelsBanks and banking, CentralEconometric modelsDebts, PublicEconometric modelsMonetary policyEconometric modelsBanks and BankingimfInflationimfPublic FinanceimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralimfFiscal PolicyimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic finance & taxationimfBankingimfExpenditureimfFiscal policyimfPublic debtimfPricesimfExpenditures, PublicimfDebts, PublicimfBanks and bankingimfExpenditures, PublicEconometric models.Fiscal policyEconometric models.Banks and banking, CentralEconometric models.Debts, PublicEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.Banks and BankingInflationPublic FinancePrice LevelDeflationNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralFiscal PolicyDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesMacroeconomicsPublic finance & taxationBankingExpenditureFiscal policyPublic debtPricesExpenditures, PublicDebts, PublicBanks and banking336.39Stehn Sven Jari1610665Vines David120880DcWaIMFBOOK9910818148203321Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt3938503UNINA