03908nam 22007694a 450 991081802050332120200520144314.01-107-12163-91-280-43005-297866104300550-511-17581-70-511-04119-50-511-15647-20-511-30257-60-511-51035-70-511-04686-3(CKB)1000000000007979(EBL)201403(OCoLC)191035568(SSID)ssj0000259379(PQKBManifestationID)11939525(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000259379(PQKBWorkID)10274478(PQKB)10174445(UkCbUP)CR9780511510359(MiAaPQ)EBC201403(Au-PeEL)EBL201403(CaPaEBR)ebr10005038(CaONFJC)MIL43005(EXLCZ)99100000000000797920000403d2001 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierTimber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia /Michael L. Ross1st ed.Cambridge, UK ;New York Cambridge University Press20011 online resource (xvi, 237 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Political economy of institutions and decisionsTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).1-107-40481-9 0-521-79167-7 Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-228).1. Introduction: Three Puzzles -- 2. The Problem of Resource Booms -- 3. Explaining Institutional Breakdown -- 4. The Philippines: The Legal Slaughter of the Forests -- 5. Sabah, Malaysia: A New State of Affairs -- 6. Sarawak, Malaysia: An Almost Uncontrollable Instinct -- 7. Indonesia: Putting the Forests to "Better Use" -- 8. Conclusion: Rent Seeking and Rent Seizing.Scholars have long studied how institutions emerge and become stable. But why do institutions sometimes break down? In this book, Michael L. Ross explores the breakdown of the institutions that govern natural resource exports in developing states. He shows that these institutions often break down when states receive positive trade shocks - unanticipated windfalls. Drawing on the theory of rent-seeking, he suggests that these institutions succumb to a problem he calls 'rent-seizing' - the predatory behavior of politicians who seek to supply rent to others, and who purposefully dismantle institutions that restrain them. Using case studies of timber booms in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, he shows how windfalls tend to trigger rent-seizing activities that may have disastrous consequences for state institutions, and for the government of natural resources. More generally, he shows how institutions can collapse when they have become endogenous to any rent-seeking process.Political economy of institutions and decisions.Forest managementEnvironmental aspectsSoutheast AsiaForest policyEnvironmental aspectsSoutheast AsiaLoggingEconomic aspectsSoutheast AsiaTimberEconomic aspectsSoutheast AsiaRent (Economic theory)Forest managementEnvironmental aspectsForest policyEnvironmental aspectsLoggingEconomic aspectsTimberEconomic aspectsRent (Economic theory)333.75/137/0959Ross Michael Lewin1961-1687078MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910818020503321Timber booms and institutional breakdown in southeast Asia4060277UNINA