05242oam 22011414 450 991081752920332120200520144314.01-4623-7193-01-4527-6623-11-4518-7053-197866128414601-282-84146-7(CKB)3170000000055097(EBL)1608000(SSID)ssj0000943007(PQKBManifestationID)11558963(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943007(PQKBWorkID)10974705(PQKB)10045201(OCoLC)762340647(IMF)WPIEE2008195(MiAaPQ)EBC1608000(IMF)WPIEA2008195(EXLCZ)99317000000005509720020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrPension Privatization and Country Risk /Alfredo Cuevas, Maria Gonzalez, Arnoldo López-Marmolejo, Davide Lombardo1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (27 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/195Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1506-3 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Country Risk, Credit Ratings and Implicit Pension Debt (IPD); Figures; 1. Standard and Poor's Creidt Ratings and Government Debt; 2. Risk Premia and International Investor Ratings; III. Econometric Analysis; Tables; 1. Institutional Investor Ratings (IIR), IPD and Debt; 2. IIR and Pension Reform: Static Panel Estimation with Fixed Effects; 3. IIR and Pension Reform: Dynamic Panel (2SLS) Estimation Results; IV. A Counterfactual Study: Mexico's Pension Reform; A. Pension Privation in Mexico; B. Risk Assessment3. Mexico: Counterfactual Explicit Debt and Primary Balance4. Estimated Impact of Pension Reform on IIR; 4. Mexico: Counterfactual IIR; V. Conclusion; VI. Annexes; ReferencesThis paper explores how privatizing a pension system can affect sovereign credit risk. For this purpose, it analyzes the importance that rating agencies give to implicit pension debt (IPD) in their assessments of sovereign creditworthiness. We find that rating agencies generally do not seem to give much weight to IPD, focusing instead on explicit public debt. However, by channeling pension contributions away from the government and creating a deficit of resources to cover the current pension liabilities during the reform's transition period, a pension privatization reform may transform IPD into explicit public debt, adversely affecting a sovereign's perceived creditworthiness, thus increasing its risk premium. In this light, accompanying pension reform with efforts to offset its transition costs through fiscal adjustment would help preserve a country's credit rating.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/195PensionsEconometric modelsPrivatizationEconometric modelsDebts, PublicEconometric modelsCountry riskEconometric modelsCredit ratingsimfDebt ManagementimfDebtimfDebts, PublicimfLaborimfMonetary economicsimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsimfPension reformimfPension spendingimfPensionsimfPrivate PensionsimfPublic debtimfPublic finance & taxationimfPublic FinanceimfSocial Security and Public PensionsimfSovereign DebtimfMexicoimfPensionsEconometric models.PrivatizationEconometric models.Debts, PublicEconometric models.Country riskEconometric models.Credit ratingsDebt ManagementDebtDebts, PublicLaborMonetary economicsMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyNonwage Labor Costs and BenefitsPension reformPension spendingPensionsPrivate PensionsPublic debtPublic finance & taxationPublic FinanceSocial Security and Public PensionsSovereign Debt331.252Cuevas Alfredo1619195Gonzalez Maria1642174Lombardo Davide613943López-Marmolejo Arnoldo1713253DcWaIMFBOOK9910817529203321Pension Privatization and Country Risk4106094UNINA