05966oam 22014534 450 991081730950332120240402045442.01-4755-6547-X1-4755-1234-1(CKB)2670000000278926(EBL)1606898(SSID)ssj0000941796(PQKBManifestationID)11510026(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941796(PQKBWorkID)10964334(PQKB)10276042(MiAaPQ)EBC1606898(Au-PeEL)EBL1606898(CaPaEBR)ebr10627147(OCoLC)870245006(IMF)WPIEE2012195(IMF)WPIEA2012195(EXLCZ)99267000000027892620020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrBarriers to Household Risk Management : Evidence from India /Robert Townsend, Shawn Cole, Jeremy Tobacman, Xavier Gine, James Vickery, Petia Topalova1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (44 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/12/195Description based upon print version of record.1-4755-9368-6 1-4755-0544-2 Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Abstract; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Insurance Contract Design and Summary Statistics; A. Product Description; B. Summary Statistics; III. Experimental Design; IV. Experimental Results; A. Andhra Pradesh; B. Gujarat: Video Experiments; C. Gujarat: Flyer Experiments; V. Discussion of Experimental Results; A. Price Relative to Actuarial Value; B. Trust; C. Liquidity Constraints; D. Financial Literacy and Education; E. Framing, Salience and Other Behavioral Factors; VI. Non-Experimental Evidence; A. Correlates of Insurance Purchase; B. Self-Reported Explanations for Non-PurchaseVII. Improving Household Risk Management: Tentative Lessons and ConclusionsReferences; VIII. AppendixWhy do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of non-systematic income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the importance of price and non-price factors in the adoption of an innovative rainfall insurance product. Demand is significantly price sensitive, but widespread take-up would not be achieved even if the product offered a payout ratio comparable to U.S. insurance contracts. We present evidence suggesting that lack of trust, liquidity constraints and limited salience are significant non-price frictions that constrain demand. We suggest contract design improvements to mitigate these frictions.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/195Financial riskIndiaRisk managementIndiaFinance: GeneralimfInsuranceimfMacroeconomicsimfIndustries: Financial ServicesimfInsurance CompaniesimfActuarial StudiesimfField ExperimentsimfEconomic Development: Financial MarketsimfSaving and Capital InvestmentimfCorporate Finance and GovernanceimfPersonal FinanceimfPortfolio ChoiceimfInvestment DecisionsimfFinancial Institutions and Services: GeneralimfEducation: GeneralimfPension FundsimfNon-bank Financial InstitutionsimfFinancial InstrumentsimfInstitutional InvestorsimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfSavingimfWealthimfInsurance & actuarial studiesimfFinanceimfEducationimfInsurance companiesimfConsumptionimfLiquidityimfFinancial institutionsimfNational accountsimfAsset and liability managementimfEconomicsimfUnited StatesimfFinancial riskRisk managementFinance: GeneralInsuranceMacroeconomicsIndustries: Financial ServicesInsurance CompaniesActuarial StudiesField ExperimentsEconomic Development: Financial MarketsSaving and Capital InvestmentCorporate Finance and GovernancePersonal FinancePortfolio ChoiceInvestment DecisionsFinancial Institutions and Services: GeneralEducation: GeneralPension FundsNon-bank Financial InstitutionsFinancial InstrumentsInstitutional InvestorsMacroeconomics: ConsumptionSavingWealthInsurance & actuarial studiesFinanceEducationInsurance companiesConsumptionLiquidityFinancial institutionsNational accountsAsset and liability managementEconomics332.1;332.152Townsend Robert248120Cole Shawn1617938Tobacman Jeremy1617939Gine Xavier1617940Vickery James1617941Topalova Petia1617942DcWaIMFBOOK9910817309503321Barriers to Household Risk Management3949368UNINA