04188nam 2200793 a 450 991081487660332120240131152632.00-8014-6314-90-8014-6313-010.7591/9780801463136(CKB)2550000000043033(OCoLC)753324071(CaPaEBR)ebrary10488672(SSID)ssj0000529812(PQKBManifestationID)11364781(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000529812(PQKBWorkID)10561148(PQKB)11711964(StDuBDS)EDZ0001495648(OCoLC)1080549011(MdBmJHUP)muse58428(DE-B1597)478271(OCoLC)956658886(OCoLC)979744036(DE-B1597)9780801463136(Au-PeEL)EBL3138236(CaPaEBR)ebr10488672(CaONFJC)MIL768211(NBER)h0074(MiAaPQ)EBC3138236(EXLCZ)99255000000004303320110202d2011 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrFixing the factsnational security and the politics of intelligenceIthaca Cornell University Press20111 online resource (275 p.)Cornell studies in security affairsBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: MonographIncludes bibliographical references and index.A basic problem : the uncertain role of intelligence in national security -- Pathologies of intelligence-policy relations -- Policy oversell and politicization -- The Johnson administration and the Vietnam estimates -- The Nixon administration and the Soviet strategic threat -- The Ford administration and the Team B affair -- Intelligence, policy, and the war in Iraq -- Politics, politicization, and the need for secrecy.What is the role of intelligence agencies in strategy and policy? How do policymakers use (or misuse) intelligence estimates? When do intelligence-policy relations work best? How do intelligence-policy failures influence threat assessment, military strategy, and foreign policy? These questions are at the heart of recent national security controversies, including the 9/11 attacks and the war in Iraq. In both cases the relationship between intelligence and policy broke down-with disastrous consequences.In Fixing the Facts, Joshua Rovner explores the complex interaction between intelligence and policy and shines a spotlight on the problem of politicization. Major episodes in the history of American foreign policy have been closely tied to the manipulation of intelligence estimates. Rovner describes how the Johnson administration dealt with the intelligence community during the Vietnam War; how President Nixon and President Ford politicized estimates on the Soviet Union; and how pressure from the George W. Bush administration contributed to flawed intelligence on Iraq. He also compares the U.S. case with the British experience between 1998 and 2003, and demonstrates that high-profile government inquiries in both countries were fundamentally wrong about what happened before the war.Cornell studies in security affairs.Intelligence servicePolitical aspectsUnited StatesFBCNational securityUnited StatesFBCNational sikkerhedFBCInternationale relationerFBCUSAFBCUnited StatesForeign relations1945-1989United StatesForeign relations1989-Intelligence servicePolitical aspectsNational securityNational sikkerhedInternationale relationerUSA327.1273z 327Rovner Joshua, authttp://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut782928Rovner Joshua782928MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910814876603321Fixing the facts1738826UNINA