05420oam 22012734 450 991081466990332120240410162754.01-4623-9722-01-4519-9339-01-282-47425-11-4527-0241-19786613821782(CKB)3360000000443216(EBL)3014487(SSID)ssj0000940715(PQKBManifestationID)11571962(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940715(PQKBWorkID)10956074(PQKB)11782171(OCoLC)694141168(IMF)WPIEE2006146(MiAaPQ)EBC3014487(EXLCZ)99336000000044321620020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWhat Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail : An Analysis of Rent Capture /Elisabeth Paul, Era Dabla-Norris1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (35 p.)IMF Working Papers"June 2006."1-4518-6406-X Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION""; ""II. A STYLIZED MODEL""; ""III. RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS""; ""IV. THE ROLE OF TRANSPARENCY""; ""V. CONCLUSIONS""; ""REFERENCES""This paper analyzes the pervasiveness and persistence of rent seeking, misgovernance, and public sector inefficiency in many developing and transition economies. We formalize evidence from country experiences and empirical studies into a stylized analytical framework that reflects realistic constraints faced in these countries. Our work departs from the standard economic literature by assuming that (i) the relationship between the government and its population is regulated through an implicit social consensus; (ii) traditional incentives (in the form of public expenditure controls, sanctions, or monetary incentives to perform) are, for various reasons, ineffective in many of these countries; and (iii) the persistence of high corruption reflects a very stable equilibrium, which in turn reflects the fact that several constraints are simultaneously binding. We argue that, when traditional incentives fail, transparency-information provision and disclosure, together with the means to use it-by relaxing different constraints, can contribute to improving public outcomes.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/146CorruptionDeveloping countriesPreventionEconometric modelsRent (Economic theory)Econometric modelsTransparency in governmentEconometric modelsLaborimfTaxationimfCriminologyimfDemographyimfBureaucracyimfAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsimfCorruptionimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfEmploymentimfUnemploymentimfWagesimfIntergenerational Income DistributionimfAggregate Human CapitalimfAggregate Labor ProductivityimfDemographic Economics: GeneralimfCorporate crimeimfwhite-collar crimeimfLabourimfincome economicsimfPublic finance & taxationimfCivil service & public sectorimfPopulation & demographyimfTax incentivesimfCivil serviceimfPopulation and demographicsimfPopulationimfBoliviaimfCorruptionPreventionEconometric models.Rent (Economic theory)Econometric models.Transparency in governmentEconometric models.LaborTaxationCriminologyDemographyBureaucracyAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsCorruptionWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: GeneralTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralEmploymentUnemploymentWagesIntergenerational Income DistributionAggregate Human CapitalAggregate Labor ProductivityDemographic Economics: GeneralCorporate crimewhite-collar crimeLabourincome economicsPublic finance & taxationCivil service & public sectorPopulation & demographyTax incentivesCivil servicePopulation and demographicsPopulationPaul Elisabeth907258Dabla-Norris Era1609994International Monetary Fund.Middle East and Central Asia Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910814669903321What Transparency Can Do When Incentives Fail4098570UNINA