04042nam 2200613Ia 450 991081232020332120200520144314.01-4623-5577-31-4527-3998-61-4518-7217-897866128429171-282-84291-9(CKB)3170000000055234(EBL)1608235(SSID)ssj0000940814(PQKBManifestationID)11492019(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940814(PQKBWorkID)10955830(PQKB)10888755(OCoLC)608248504(MiAaPQ)EBC1608235(IMF)WPIEE2009070(EXLCZ)99317000000005523420041202d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrFinancial stability frameworks and the role of central banks lessons from the crisis /prepared by Erlend W. Nier1st ed.[Washington D.C.] International Monetary Fund20091 online resource (66 p.)IMF working paper ;WP/09/70Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1652-3 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; Executive Summary; I. The Role of Central Banks in Financial Stability-Lessons from the Crisis; A. Monetary Policy; B. Provision of Systemic Liquidity; C. Lender of Last Resort and Resolution of Failing Institutions; D. Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems; II. Costs and Benefits of a Role of Central Banks in Financial Regulation; III. Recent Debates on Financial Stability Frameworks; IV. Financial Regulation-Objectives, Tools, Scope; A. Why Regulate Financial Institutions?; B. How to Regulate Financial Institutions?; C. Who Should be Regulated?; Boxes1. Originate and Distribute and Systemic RiskV. Financial Regulation-Agency Structure; A. Principles; B. Comparison of Existing Structures; 2. Financial Stability Frameworks Across Countries; 3. Special Considerations for Government Sponsored Entities; 4. International Considerations; VI. Conclusions; References; Appendixes; I. Some Preliminary Empirical Analysis; Figures; 1. Developed Europe: Bank Losses; 2. Developed Europe: Overall Loss to Credit RatioThis paper sets out general principles for the design of financial stability frameworks, starting from an analysis of the objectives and tools of financial regulation. The paper then offers a comprehensive analysis of the costs and benefits of the two main models that have emerged for modern financial systems: the integrated model, with a single supervisor outside of the central bank, and the twin-peaks model, with a systemic risk regulator (central bank) on the one hand and a conduct of business regulator on the other. The paper concludes that the twin-peaks model may become more attractive when regulatory structures are geared more explicitly towards the mitigation of systemic risk-including through the introduction of new macroprudential tools that could be used alongside monetary policy to contain macro-systemic risks; through enhanced regulation and special resolution regimes for systemically important institutions; and a more holistic approach to the oversight of clearing and settlement systems. Since the optimal solution may well be path-dependent and specific to the development of financial markets in any given country, a number of hybrid models are also discussed.IMF working paper ;WP/09/70.Economic stabilizationBanks and banking, CentralEconomic stabilization.Banks and banking, Central.332.152Nier Erlend1610210MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910812320203321Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks4014886UNINA