03864nam 2200697Ia 450 991081153370332120200520144314.01-282-35279-297866123527990-300-14868-210.12987/9780300148688(CKB)2420000000001351(StDuBDS)BDZ0022171536(SSID)ssj0000336137(PQKBManifestationID)11260775(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000336137(PQKBWorkID)10278538(PQKB)10041255(StDuBDS)EDZ0000158245(MiAaPQ)EBC3420586(DE-B1597)485344(OCoLC)587634199(DE-B1597)9780300148688(Au-PeEL)EBL3420586(CaPaEBR)ebr10348483(CaONFJC)MIL235279(OCoLC)923594788(EXLCZ)99242000000000135120090908d2009 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrConstitutional courts and democratic values a European perspective /Victor Ferreres Comella1st ed.New Haven ;London Yale University Pressc20091 online resource (1 online resource (xvi, 238 p.)) Bibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph0-300-14867-4 Includes bibliographical references (p. 159-222) and index.Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Rise of Constitutional Courts -- 2. Historical Background: The Principle of Separation of Powers -- 3. A Traditional Justification: Legal Certainty -- 4. The Justification of Constitutional Review: The Sketch of an Argument -- 5. The Special Nature of Constitutional Discourse -- 6. The Structure of the Constitutional Conversation -- 7. Overcoming Judicial Timidity -- 8. The Democratic Objection to Constitutional Review -- 9. Democratic Checks on Courts -- 10. Decentralizing Tendencies in the System -- 11. The Impact of the European Court of Justice -- 12. The Impact of the European Court of Human Rights -- Afterword -- Notes -- IndexIn this book, Víctor Ferreres Comella contrasts the European "centralized" constitutional court model, in which one court system is used to adjudicate constitutional questions, with a decentralized model, such as that of the United States, in which courts deal with both constitutional and nonconstitutional questions. Comella's systematic exploration of the reasons for and against the creation of constitutional courts is rich in detail and offers an ambitious theory to justify the European preference for them. Based on extensive research on eighteen European countries, Comella finds that centralized review fits well with the civil law tradition and structures of ordinary adjudication in those countries. Comella concludes that-while the decentralized model works for the United States-there is more than one way to preserve democratic values and that these values are best preserved in the parliamentary democracies of Europe through constitutional courts. Constitutional courts & democratic valuesConstitutional courtsEuropeConstitutional courtsUnited StatesJudicial reviewEuropeJudicial reviewUnited StatesConstitutional courtsConstitutional courtsJudicial reviewJudicial review347.4035Ferreres Comella Victor522665MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910811533703321Constitutional courts and democratic values3961200UNINA