03616nam 2200685 a 450 99647205780331620200520144314.01-282-08847-597866120884760-300-14265-X10.12987/9780300142655(CKB)1000000000764766(EBL)3420425(SSID)ssj0000107346(PQKBManifestationID)11142923(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000107346(PQKBWorkID)10015492(PQKB)10671855(MiAaPQ)EBC3420425(DE-B1597)484861(OCoLC)567973929(DE-B1597)9780300142655(Au-PeEL)EBL3420425(CaPaEBR)ebr10315685(CaONFJC)MIL208847(OCoLC)923593754(EXLCZ)99100000000076476620071129d2008 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierThe atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War[electronic resource] /Campbell Craig, Sergey RadchenkoNew Haven Yale University Pressc20081 online resource (xxv, 201 pages)Description based upon print version of record.0-300-11028-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-195) and index.Franklin Delano Roosevelt and atomic wartime diplomacy -- The great game -- Truman, the bomb, and the end of World War II -- Responding to Hiroshima and Nagasaki -- The Baruch Plan and the onset of American Cold War -- Stalin and the burial of international control.After a devastating world war, culminating in the obliteration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it was clear that the United States and the Soviet Union had to establish a cooperative order if the planet was to escape an atomic World War III. In this provocative study, Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko show how the atomic bomb pushed the United States and the Soviet Union not toward cooperation but toward deep bipolar confrontation. Joseph Stalin, sure that the Americans meant to deploy their new weapon against Russia and defeat socialism, would stop at nothing to build his own bomb. Harry Truman, initially willing to consider cooperation, discovered that its pursuit would mean political suicide, especially when news of Soviet atomic spies reached the public. Both superpowers, moreover, discerned a new reality of the atomic age: now, cooperation must be total. The dangers posed by the bomb meant that intermediate measures of international cooperation would protect no one. Yet no two nations in history were less prepared to pursue total cooperation than were the United States and the Soviet Union. The logic of the bomb pointed them toward immediate Cold War.Cold WarAtomic bombPolitical aspectsUnited StatesForeign relationsSoviet UnionSoviet UnionForeign relationsUnited StatesUnited StatesForeign relations1945-1953Soviet UnionForeign relations1945-1991Electronic books.Cold War.Atomic bombPolitical aspects.909.82/5Craig Campbell1964-473415Radchenko Sergey505649MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK996472057803316Atomic bomb and the origins of the Cold War804845UNISA02165nam 2200517 450 991081099080332120200520144314.00-309-48373-50-309-48371-9(CKB)4100000007009679(MiAaPQ)EBC5540418(Au-PeEL)EBL5540418(CaPaEBR)ebr11618561(OCoLC)1056882056(BIP)066039658(EXLCZ)99410000000700967920181025d2018 uy 0engurcnu||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierRecoverability as a first-class security objective proceedings of a workshopWashington, D. C. :The National Academies Press,[2018]20181 online resource (61 pages)0-309-48370-0 The Forum on Cyber Resilience of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine hosted the Workshop on Recoverability as a First-Class Security Objective on February 8, 2018, in Washington, D.C. The workshop featured presentations from several experts in industry, research, and government roles who spoke about the complex facets of recoverability?that is, the ability to restore normal operations and security in a system affected by software or hardware failure or a deliberate attack. This publication summarizes the presentations and discussions from the workshop.Computer securityCongressesData Recovery (Computer Science)Computer SecurityComputersComputer security005.8Millett Lynette I.edtJohnson Anne FrancesedtDivision on Engineering and Physical Sciences,Computer Science and Telecommunications Board,Committee on Cyber Resilience Workshop Series,MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910810990803321Recoverability as a first-class security objective4094357UNINA