03910nam 22006615 450 991080854790332120210823153358.01-5017-0390-01-5017-0391-910.7591/9781501703911(CKB)3710000000632582(EBL)4517903(SSID)ssj0001640280(PQKBManifestationID)16399518(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001640280(PQKBWorkID)13526523(PQKB)10186479(MiAaPQ)EBC4517903(OCoLC)1080549337(MdBmJHUP)muse58356(DE-B1597)496617(OCoLC)945976875(DE-B1597)9781501703911(EXLCZ)99371000000063258220190708d2016 fg 0engurnn#---|un|utxtccrThe Soul of Armies Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Military Culture in the US and UK /Austin LongIthaca, NY :Cornell University Press,[2016]©20161 online resource (288 p.)Cornell Studies in Security AffairsDescription based upon print version of record.1-5017-0319-6 0-8014-5379-8 Includes bibliographical references and index.Front matter --Contents --Preface --Chapter 1. Military Doctrine and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency --Chapter 2. Culture, Doctrine, and Military Professionalization --Chapter 3. "The Habits and Usages of War" --Chapter 4. From the Halls of Montezuma --Chapter 5. A Family of Regiments --Chapter 6. "A Nasty, Untidy Mess" --Chapter 7. A Natural Experiment in I Corps, 1966-68 --Chapter 8. Out of Africa --Chapter 9. Counterinsurgency in the Land of Two Rivers --Chapter 10. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2003-11 --Conclusions --Notes --IndexFor both the United States and United Kingdom counterinsurgency was a serious component of security policy during the Cold War and, along with counterterrorism, has been the greatest security challenge after September 11, 2001. In The Soul of Armies Austin Long compares and contrasts counterinsurgency operations during the Cold War and in recent years by three organizations: the US Army, the US Marine Corps, and the British Army. Long argues that the formative experiences of these three organizations as they professionalized in the nineteenth century has produced distinctive organizational cultures that shape operations. Combining archival research on counterinsurgency campaigns in Vietnam and Kenya with the author's personal experience as a civilian advisor to the military in Iraq and Afghanistan, The Soul of Armies demonstrates that the US Army has persistently conducted counterinsurgency operations in a very different way from either the US Marine Corps or the British Army. These differences in conduct have serious consequences, affecting the likelihood of success, the potential for civilian casualties and collateral damage, and the ability to effectively support host nation governments. Long concludes counterinsurgency operations are at best only a partial explanation for success or failure.Cornell studies in security affairs.CounterinsurgencyMilitary doctrineGreat BritainMilitary doctrineUnited StatesGreat BritainArmed ForcesAttitudesUnited StatesArmed ForcesAttitudesCounterinsurgency.Military doctrineMilitary doctrine355.02/180941Long Austin G.986688DE-B1597DE-B1597BOOK9910808547903321The Soul of Armies4056427UNINA