05899oam 22013214 450 991080734170332120240402045511.01-4755-2021-21-4755-3924-X(CKB)2670000000278823(EBL)1606936(SSID)ssj0000949374(PQKBManifestationID)11521999(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000949374(PQKBWorkID)10996015(PQKB)10526840(Au-PeEL)EBL1606936(CaPaEBR)ebr10627044(OCoLC)805985260(IMF)WPIEE2012204(IMF)WPIEA2012204(MiAaPQ)EBC1606936(EXLCZ)99267000000027882320020129d2012 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrDonor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation /Kurt Annen, Luc Moers1st ed.Washington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2012.1 online resource (38 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4755-5957-7 1-4755-0554-X Includes bibliographical references.Cover; Contents; 1 Introduction; 2 Donor Coordination in Practice: Fragmentation; Figures; 1 Number of Recipient Countries and Global Aid Budget Shares; 2 Global Aid Herfindahl Index; 3 Background Literature; 4 Model; 4.1 Donors Maximize Net Aid Impact; 4.2 Donors Maximize Relative Net Aid Impact; 3 Best-Response Functions with Identical Donors; 4.3 Introducing Fixed Costs; 4 Best-Response Functions with Non-Identical Donors; 4.4 Introducing More Recipients and More Donors; 5 Empirical Evidence; Tables; 1 Larger Donors vs. Smaller Donors; 5 Herfindahl Index and Relative Donor Size2 Donor Ranking in Aid Selectivity3 Donor Selectivity and Herfindahl Index; 6 Conclusion; References; Appendix A; Proof of Proposition 1; Description of Best-Response Functions; Proof of Proposition 4; Appendix B; Table 4: Donor Selectivity and MLD; Table 5: Donor Selectivity and Theil IndexThis paper shows that donors that maximize relative aid impact spread their budgets across many recipient countries in a unique Nash equilibrium, explaining aid fragmentation. This equilibrium may be inefficient even without fixed costs, and the inefficiency increases in the equality of donors budgets. The paper presents empirical evidence consistent with theoretical results. These imply that, short of ending donors maximization of relative aid impact, agreements to better coordinate aid allocations are not implementable. Moreover, since policies to increase donor competition in terms of aid effectiveness risk reinforcing relativeness, they may well backfire, as any such reinforcement increases aid fragmentation.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2012/204Economic assistanceFlow of fundsBudgetingimfExports and ImportsimfFinance: GeneralimfSocial Services and WelfareimfPoverty and HomelessnessimfAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralimfForeign AidimfInternational Fiscal IssuesimfInternational Public GoodsimfNational BudgetimfBudget SystemsimfWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: GeneralimfGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)imfGovernment PolicyimfProvision and Effects of Welfare ProgramimfInternational economicsimfBudgeting & financial managementimfPoverty & precarityimfFinanceimfSocial welfare & social servicesimfForeign aidimfBudget planning and preparationimfPovertyimfCompetitionimfPoverty reductionimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfFinancial marketsimfInternational reliefimfBudgetimfChina, People's Republic ofimfEconomic assistance.Flow of funds.BudgetingExports and ImportsFinance: GeneralSocial Services and WelfarePoverty and HomelessnessAnalysis of Collective Decision-Making: GeneralForeign AidInternational Fiscal IssuesInternational Public GoodsNational BudgetBudget SystemsWelfare, Well-Being, and Poverty: GeneralGeneral Financial Markets: General (includes Measurement and Data)Government PolicyProvision and Effects of Welfare ProgramInternational economicsBudgeting & financial managementPoverty & precarityFinanceSocial welfare & social servicesForeign aidBudget planning and preparationPovertyCompetitionPoverty reductionPublic financial management (PFM)Financial marketsInternational reliefBudget337Annen Kurt1676914Moers Luc1676915DcWaIMFBOOK9910807341703321Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation4043396UNINA