04278nam 2200733Ia 450 991080713460332120200520144314.01-282-45670-997866124567013-11-021229-310.1515/9783110212297(CKB)1000000000820826(EBL)476070(OCoLC)609852887(SSID)ssj0000364817(PQKBManifestationID)11290344(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000364817(PQKBWorkID)10419475(PQKB)11495980(MiAaPQ)EBC476070(DE-B1597)35618(OCoLC)647843548(OCoLC)775645324(DE-B1597)9783110212297(Au-PeEL)EBL476070(CaPaEBR)ebr10359381(CaONFJC)MIL245670(PPN)175571295(PPN)151752567(EXLCZ)99100000000082082620091106d2009 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrProlepsis and Ennoia in the early Stoa[electronic resource] /Henry DysonBerlin ;New York Walter de Gruyter20091 online resource (300 p.)Sozomena studies in the recovery of ancient texts ;v. 5Description based upon print version of record.3-11-021228-5 Includes bibliographical references and index. Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction: The Seeds of Virtue and Knowledge -- Chapter One: Are Porlepses and Common Conceptions Identical? -- Chapter Two: Prolepsis and Common Conceptions as Criteria of Truth -- Chapter Three: Stages in the Development of Reason -- Interim Conclusions: Meno's Paradox and the Early Stoa -- Chapter Four: The Formation of Prolepses -- Chapter Five: Prolepsis in Ordinary and Philosophical Cognition -- Conclusion: Are the Stoics Empiricists or Rationalists? -- Tables: The Usage of Πρόληψις, ΄ʹΕννοια, and Related Terms -- Appendix A: Epicurus and Later Epicureans -- Appendix B: The Early Stoa -- Appendix C: Cicero and Seneca -- Appendix D: Epictetus -- Appendix E: Plutarch -- Appendix F: Sextus Empiricus -- Appendix G: Alexander of Aphrodisias -- Appendix H: Alcinous -- BackmatterThis book reconstructs the Stoic doctrine of prolepsis. Prolepses are conceptions that develop naturally from ordinary experience. They are often identified with preconceptions (i.e. the first conceptions one unconsciously forms of something). However, this is inconsistent with the Stoics' claim that prolepseis are criteria of truth. Rather, prolepseis are analytically true claims embedded within one's ordinary conceptual scheme (e.g. the good is beneficial). When they have been articulated and systematized, prolepseis can be used to judge conceptual claims that go beyond the scope of sense-perceptual knowledge (e.g. pleasure is the good). The Stoics often refer to prolepseis as "common conceptions" to emphasize that they are shared by everyone, although in most people they remain unarticulated. This reconstruction suggests that Chrysippus was influenced by Platonic recollection to a greater extent than previously recognized. It supports the orthodoxy of Epictetus' statements about prolepsis and suggests that later authors who assimilate the Epicurean and Stoic doctrines were misled by the polemical attacks of Carneades. The argument of the book is supported by a comprehensive collection of fragments relating to prolepsis in Epicurus, the early Stoa, Cicero, Epictetus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, and Alexander of Aphrodisias. SozomenaStoicsPhilosophy, AncientConceptions.Epictetus.Meno.Prolepsis.Stoics.Stoics.Philosophy, Ancient.188Dyson Henry1975-1643636MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910807134603321Prolepsis and Ennoia in the early Stoa3988999UNINA