04676nam 2200709Ia 450 991080700970332120221108101418.00-674-26327-80-674-03643-310.4159/9780674036437(CKB)1000000000787124(StDuBDS)AH21620408(SSID)ssj0000215972(PQKBManifestationID)11191050(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000215972(PQKBWorkID)10194725(PQKB)11766064(Au-PeEL)EBL3300186(CaPaEBR)ebr10314193(OCoLC)923109758(DE-B1597)574341(DE-B1597)9780674036437(MiAaPQ)EBC3300186(OCoLC)1243310606(EXLCZ)99100000000078712419901128d1991 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtccrOrder without law[electronic resource] how neighbors settle disputes /Robert C. EllicksonCambridge, MA Harvard University Press19911 online resource (ix,302p.) Includes index.0-674-64168-X 0-674-64169-8 Includes bibliographical references and index.Introduction Part I. Shasta County 1. Shasta County and Its Cattle Industry 2. The Politics of Cattle Trespass 3. The Resolution of Cattle-Trespass Disputes 4. Who Pays for Boundary Fences? 5. Disputes Arising out of Highway Collisions Involving Livestock 6. The Effects of Closed-Range Ordinances Part II. A Theory of Norms 7. The System of Social Control S. Shortcomings of Current Theories of Social Control 9. The Puzzle of Cooperation 10. A Hypothesis of Welfare-Maximizing Norms 11. Substantive Norms: Of Bees, Cattle, and Whales 12. Remedial Norms: Of Carrots and Sticks 13. Procedural and Constitutive Norms: Of Gossip, Ritual, and Hero Worship 14. Controller-Selecting Norms: Of Contracts, Custom, and Photocopies Part III. The Future of Norms 15. Testing the Content of Norms 16. Conclusions and Implications Appendix. Research Methods IndexIntegrating the current research in law, economics, sociology, game theory and anthropology, this text demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules - social norms - without the need for a state or other central co-ordinator to lay down the law.In Order without Law Robert C. Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules-social norms-that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson's theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In "The Problem of Social Cost" --the most frequently cited article on law--economist Ronald H. Cease depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson's field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase's vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord-tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.Sociological jurisprudenceDispute resolution (Law)CaliforniaShasta CountyCompromise (Law)CaliforniaShasta CountyTrespassCaliforniaShasta CountyCattleCaliforniaShasta CountySocial controlSociological jurisprudence.Dispute resolution (Law)Compromise (Law)TrespassCattleSocial control.340.115Ellickson Robert C1706653MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910807009703321Order without law4094252UNINA