03706nam 2200757Ia 450 991080610440332120200520144314.01-107-16071-51-280-48012-20-511-22046-40-511-22097-90-511-21897-40-511-31620-80-511-60689-30-511-21965-2(CKB)1000000000353196(EBL)261099(OCoLC)252521692(SSID)ssj0000105283(PQKBManifestationID)11131052(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000105283(PQKBWorkID)10100798(PQKB)10147331(UkCbUP)CR9780511606892(MiAaPQ)EBC261099(Au-PeEL)EBL261099(CaPaEBR)ebr10130383(CaONFJC)MIL48012(OCoLC)162545119(EXLCZ)99100000000035319620060207d2006 uy 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierArchitects of political change constitutional quandaries and social choice theory /Norman Schofield1st ed.Cambridge ;New York Cambridge University Press20061 online resource (xiv, 317 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Political economy of institutions and decisionsTitle from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 05 Oct 2015).0-521-53972-2 0-521-83202-0 Includes bibliographical references and index.Constitutional quandaries and social choice -- Power and social choice -- Franklin and the War of Independence -- Madison, Jefferson, and Condorcet -- Lincoln and the Civil War -- Johnson and the critical realignment of 1964 -- Keynes and the Atlantic constitution -- Preferences and beliefs -- Political change.This work offers a set of extended interpretations of Madison's argument in Federalist X of 1787, using ideas from social choice theory and from the work of Douglass North, Mancur Olson, and William Riker. Its focus is not on rational choice theory itself, but on the use of this theory as a heuristic device to better understand democratic institutions. The treatment adapts a formal model of elections to consider rapid constitutional change at periods when societies face quandaries. The topics explored in the book include Britain's reorganization of its fiscal system in the eighteenth century to prosecute its wars with France; the Colonies' decision to declare independence in 1776; Madison's argument about the 'probability of fit choice' during the Ratification period of 1787-88; the argument between Hamilton and Jefferson in 1798-1800 over the long run organization of the US economy and the election of Lincoln in 1860. Political economy of institutions and decisions.Political scienceEconomic aspectsSocial choicePolitical aspectsConstitutional historyUnited StatesElectionsMathematical modelsUnited StatesPolitics and governmentPhilosophyPolitical scienceEconomic aspects.Social choicePolitical aspects.Constitutional historyElectionsMathematical models.320.97301Schofield Norman1944-120762MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910806104403321Architects of political change4036151UNINA