03852nam 2200721 450 991079848900332120230808193445.03-11-046479-93-11-046580-910.1515/9783110465808(CKB)3710000000718457(EBL)4556868(SSID)ssj0001678301(PQKBManifestationID)16486312(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001678301(PQKBWorkID)15014276(PQKB)11068416(MiAaPQ)EBC4556868(DE-B1597)462387(OCoLC)979838926(DE-B1597)9783110465808(Au-PeEL)EBL4556868(CaPaEBR)ebr11223091(CaONFJC)MIL931438(OCoLC)951978235(EXLCZ)99371000000071845720160624h20162016 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrDemonstrative thought a pragmatic view /Felipe Nogueira de CarvalhoBerlin, [Germany] ;Boston, [Massachusetts] :De Gruyter,2016.©20161 online resource (286 p.)Epistemische Studien,2198-1884 ;Band 34Description based upon print version of record.3-11-046466-7 Includes bibliographical references and index.Frontmatter -- Foreword -- Contents -- 1. Introduction: What is Demonstrative Thought and How to Explain it? -- 2. Perceptualist Approaches to Demonstrative Thought -- 3. Attention-based Perceptualist Theories of Demonstrative Thought -- 4. Non-attentional Perceptualist Theories of Demonstrative Thought -- 5. The Conceptualist Challenge to Demonstrative Thought -- 6. The Pragmatic View of Demonstrative Thought (I): Practical Knowledge -- 7. The Pragmatic View of Demonstrative Thought (II): Object Representation -- Bibliography -- Index How can we explain our capacity to think about particulars in our external environment? Many philosophers have answered this question in terms of a sophisticated conception of space and time and the movement of objects therein. A more recent reaction against this view sought to explain this capacity solely in terms of perceptual mechanisms of object individuation. Neither explanation remains fully satisfactory.This book argues for a more desirable middle ground in terms of a pragmatist approach to demonstrative thought, where this capacity is explained through graded practical knowledge of objects.This view allows us to do justice to important insights put forward by both positions criticized in the book, while avoiding their potential shortcomings. It also paves the way to a more pragmatist approach to the theory of mental representation, where the notion of practical knowledge is allowed to play a central role in our cognitive life. Finally, it shows how practical knowledge may be firmly rooted in neurobiological processes and mechanisms that conform to what the empirical sciences tell us about the mind.Deutsche Hochschulschriften. Epistemische Studien ;Band 34.Object (Philosophy)Individuation (Philosophy)Mental representationMental representation.cognition.neurobiology.perception.practical knowledge.Object (Philosophy)Individuation (Philosophy)Mental representation.121.4Nogueira de Carvalho Felipe1979-1511224MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910798489003321Demonstrative thought3744332UNINA