04042nam 2200733 a 450 991079235750332120211005205203.01-282-60195-4978661260195890-474-3131-610.1163/ej.9789004157811.i-299(CKB)2670000000012574(SSID)ssj0000337565(PQKBManifestationID)11256543(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000337565(PQKBWorkID)10289368(PQKB)11275289(MiAaPQ)EBC489346(OCoLC)77522457(nllekb)BRILL9789047431312(Au-PeEL)EBL489346(CaPaEBR)ebr10372741(CaONFJC)MIL260195(OCoLC)654851286(MiAaPQ)EBC3004268(Au-PeEL)EBL3004268(OCoLC)928192041(PPN)17439795X(EXLCZ)99267000000001257420061208d2007 uy 0engurcn|||||||||txtccrThe failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda[electronic resource] the role of bystanders /Fred Grünfeld, Anke Huijboom1st ed.Leiden ;Boston Martinus Nijhoffc2007xxix, 299 p. illInternational and comparative criminal law seriesBibliographic Level Mode of Issuance: Monograph90-04-15781-6 Includes bibliographical references (p. 279-289) and index.Early warnings and early action by bystanders -- The tribunal's interpretation and implementation of the genocide convention -- Rwandan history -- Undermining UNAMIR -- The installment of UNAMIR with Belgian participation -- Early warning of atrocities in 1991-1994 -- Early warnings from November to January -- The genocide fax and the prohibition from U.N. headquarters to act -- The negative response of New York and capitals in the west to the deteriorating situation -- Deteriorating security in Rwanda and the negative response from New York from January up until March -- Requests from Dallaire and from Belgium to New York for a stronger and firmer broadened mandate for UNAMIR -- UNAMIR : its mandate and the offending Belgian role -- The start of the genocide -- Evacuation -- Belgian decision to withdraw its troops -- The response of the Security Council -- The role of the Netherlands throughout the genocide -- Apologies from bystanders ten years later.This volume is about the failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda in 1994. In particular, the research focuses on why the early warnings of an emerging genocide were not translated into early preventative action. The warnings were well documented by the most authoritative source, the Canadian U.N. peace-keeping commander General Romeo Dallaire and sent to the leading political civil servants in New York. The communications and the decisionmaking are scrutinized, id est, who received what messages at what time, to whom the messages were forwarded and which (non-) decisions were taken in response to the alarming reports of weapon deliveries and atrocities. This book makes clear that this genocide could have been prevented. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.International and comparative criminal law series.GenocidePreventionHumanitarian interventionInternational agenciesGenocideRwandaHistory20th centuryGenocidePrevention.Humanitarian intervention.International agencies.GenocideHistory967.57104/31Grünfeld Fred1949-1524806Huijboom Anke724963MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910792357503321The failure to prevent genocide in Rwanda3766075UNINA