05975nam 22007332 450 991079028060332120151014143835.01-139-23420-X1-107-22504-31-280-39336-X1-139-23269-X97866135712811-139-04942-91-139-23046-81-139-22902-81-139-23347-51-139-23193-6(CKB)2670000000177941(EBL)866879(OCoLC)793510852(SSID)ssj0000631617(PQKBManifestationID)11415163(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000631617(PQKBWorkID)10599717(PQKB)11053466(UkCbUP)CR9781139049429(MiAaPQ)EBC866879(Au-PeEL)EBL866879(CaPaEBR)ebr10559488(CaONFJC)MIL357128(EXLCZ)99267000000017794120110307d2012|||| uy| 0engur|||||||||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierAchieving nuclear ambitions scientists, politicians and proliferation /Jacques E. C. Hymans[electronic resource]Cambridge :Cambridge University Press,2012.1 online resource (xii, 315 pages) digital, PDF file(s)Title from publisher's bibliographic system (viewed on 08 Oct 2015).0-521-13225-8 0-521-76700-8 Includes bibliographical references and index.Cover; Achieving Nuclear Ambitions; Title; Copyright; Contents; Figures; Table; Preface; Abbreviations; 1 The puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency; The empirical puzzle of declining nuclear weapons project efficiency; The simple techno-centric perspective; More sophisticated techno-centric claims; The will to go nuclear; The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); Entangling alliances; Vulnerability to military threats; Economic resources; The argument of the book in brief; Core hypotheses; A preliminary empirical testFrom state institutionalization to efficiency: a quantitative analysisFrom autonomy to efficiency: evidence from the first five nuclear weapon states; Bringing implementation back in; Road map; 2 A theory of nuclear weapons project efficiency and inefficiency; The micro level: management approach, worker motivation, and the functioning of nuclear weapons projects; The top-down model, or, how not to manage a nuclear weapons project; The bottom-up model, or, how to manage a nuclear weapons project; Summary: three hypotheses on management and proliferationThe macro level: efficiency of nuclear weapons projects as a function of state institutionalizationDefining Weberian legal-rational and neo-patrimonial states; Weberian legal-rationalism's promotion of scientific and technical professionalism; Consequences of the "privileged" institutional status of nuclear programs; The special case of professional military-run nuclear weapons projects; Changing state institutionalization to create efficient nuclear weapons projects; The fate of nuclear programs in legal-rationalizing and neo-patrimonializing states; Summary of the basic causal argumentsInternational nuclear cooperation: a shortcut?Operationalization and case selection; 3 Spinning in place; Review of technical assessments of the pre-1991 Iraqi nuclear program; Pre-war estimates; The IAEA's estimate; Kelley's estimate; Explaining Iraq's nuclear inefficiency: management and institutions; Iraq's neo-patrimonial state; The Osiraq myth; 1981-1987: scientists in power?; 1987-1988: Hussein Kamel's power grab; Life under Kamel; 1990-1991: the crash program; "If the Gulf War had not intervened ...": questioning the premise of the counterfactual; After 1991: the Iraqi nuclear mirageConclusion4 How did China's nuclear weapons project succeed?; China's nuclear success is a big social science puzzle; International deus ex machina?; Explaining China's nuclear success: three key variables; Unlimited political support; Strongly professional organization; Leadership self-restraint; Self-restraint or institutional constraint?; The importance of efficiency: a comparison of China's nuclear weapons project with its nuclear submarine project; Conclusion; 5 Proliferation implications of international civil nuclear cooperation:; Introduction: from domestic to international variablesAtoms for Peace's growing chorus of criticsDespite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in proliferation, Jacques E. C. Hymans focuses on the relations between politicians and scientific and technical workers in developing countries. By undermining the workers' spirit of professionalism, developing country rulers unintentionally thwart their own nuclear ambitions. Combining rich theoretical analysis, in-depth historical case studies of Iraq, China, Yugoslavia and Argentina and insightful analyses of current-day proliferant states, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions develops a powerful new perspective that effectively counters the widespread fears of a coming cascade of new nuclear powers.Nuclear weaponsDeveloping countriesNuclear nonproliferationDeveloping countriesNuclear weaponsNuclear nonproliferation623.4/5119091724POL011000bisacshHymans Jacques E. C.1474951UkCbUPUkCbUPBOOK9910790280603321Achieving nuclear ambitions3688890UNINA03637nam 2200553 450 991082255530332120220929154504.01-5017-2504-110.7591/9781501725043(CKB)4100000005321323(OCoLC)1080549493(MdBmJHUP)muse69809(DE-B1597)515476(OCoLC)1088924481(DE-B1597)9781501725043(MiAaPQ)EBC6990463(Au-PeEL)EBL6990463(EXLCZ)99410000000532132320220929d1990 u| 0engur|||||||nn|ntxtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrierCooperation among nations Europe, America, and non-tariff barriers to trade /Joseph M. GriecoIthaca, NY :Cornell University Press,[1990]©19901 online resource (xii, 255 p. )Cornell Studies in Political Economy0-8014-9699-3 0-8014-2414-3 Includes bibliographical references.Frontmatter -- Contents -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Anarchy and Cooperation among Nations -- 2. Realism, Neoliberal Institutionalism, and the Problem of International Cooperation -- 3. The Tokyo Round Regime on Non-tariff Barriers to Trade -- 4. Rule Compliance and Dispute Settlement in the Tokyo Round NTB Regime, 1980-1987 -- 5. Rule Construction in the Tokyo Round NTB Regime, 1980-1987 -- 6. The Tokyo Round NTB Regime and Neoliberal Institutionalism -- 7. The Tokyo Round NTB Regime and Realist International Theory -- 8. Realism and Cooperation among Nations -- Appendixes -- IndexIn Cooperation among Nations, Joseph M. Grieco offers a provocative answer to a fundamental question in world politics: How does the anarchical nature of the international system inhibit the willingness of states to work together even when they share common interests?Grieco examines the capacity of two leading contemporary theories-modem political realism and the newest liberal institutionalism-to explain national responses to the non-tariff barrier codes negotiated during the Tokyo Round of international trade talks. According to his interpretation of realist theory, Grieco characterizes states as "defensive positionalists." As such, they often fail to cooperate because they fear that a joint endeavor, while producing positive gains for all participants, might also generate disparities in gains among the partners involved. Grieco demonstrates that this realist concept of defensive state positionalism gives rise to a better understanding of the systemic constraints on international collaboration and of the impact of anarchy on states than is offered by neoliberal institutionalism. Drawing on previously unreported archival materials, Grieco rigorously applies the two theories to an empirical analysis of the cooperative efforts of the United States and the European Community during the 1980s to regulate and reduce non-tariff trade barriers through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.Cornell Studies in Political EconomyLiberalismRealismUnited StatesForeign economic relationsLiberalism.Realism.382.30973Grieco Joseph M.252270MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910822555303321Cooperation among nations3962944UNINA