05399nam 2201189Ia 450 991079018100332120230801221958.01-280-49411-597866135893471-4008-4251-410.1515/9781400842513(CKB)2670000000161942(EBL)879140(OCoLC)845243797(SSID)ssj0000623605(PQKBManifestationID)11374086(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000623605(PQKBWorkID)10656678(PQKB)10822546(MiAaPQ)EBC879140(StDuBDS)EDZ0000406930(OCoLC)782925047(MdBmJHUP)muse37106(DE-B1597)447964(OCoLC)979742306(DE-B1597)9781400842513(Au-PeEL)EBL879140(CaPaEBR)ebr10546810(CaONFJC)MIL358934(EXLCZ)99267000000016194220110930d2012 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWhy adjudicate?[electronic resource] enforcing trade rules in the WTO /Christina L. DavisCourse BookPrinceton, NJ Princeton University Press20121 online resource (345 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-691-15275-6 0-691-15276-4 Includes bibliographical references and index. Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Domestic Constraints And Active Enforcement -- 3. The Democratic Propensity For Adjudication -- 4. The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy -- 5. The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy -- 6. Conflict Management: Evaluating The Effectiveness Of Adjudication -- 7. Level Playing Field? Adjudication By Developing Countries -- 8. Conclusion -- Bibliography -- IndexThe World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens. Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.Foreign trade regulationAdministrative procedureChina.Japan.Japanese trade policy.Peru.U.S. Congress.U.S. trade policy.United States.Vietnam.WTO.World Trade Organization.accountability.adjudication.bargaining.bureaucracy.conflict.cooperation.courts.delegation of authority.democracy.democratic politics.developing countries.dispute settlement.domestic constraints.domestic politics.exports.foreign economic policy.free trade.geopolitics.industry lobbying.international politics.international relations.international trade law.international trade.labeling.legalization.liberalization.politicization.trade barriers.trade disputes.trade law enforcement.trade policy.trade.Foreign trade regulation.Administrative procedure.382/.92MK 8650BVBrvkDavis Christina L.1971-1462562MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910790181003321Why adjudicate3671583UNINA01028nam a2200277 i 450099100370988970753620250306123702.0131001s2013 enk 001 | eng d9781118672327b14375229-39ule_instBibl. Dip.le Aggr. Scienze Economia - Sez. Settore Economicoita330.01595Baltagi, Badi H140847Econometric analysis of panel data /Badi H. Baltagi5. edChichester :Wiley,c2013xiii, 373 p. ;25 cmBibliografia: p. 339-360EconometriaPanel analysis.b1437522929-01-2030-10-19991003709889707536LE025 ECO 330 BAL01.01 201312025000286443le025Libro di testo a.a. 2019/2020 Prof.ssa Mastromarco-E61.90-lc00000.i1591762929-01-20Econometric analysis of panel data625784UNISALENTOle02530-10-19maengenk00