04174nam 2200577Ia 450 991078990740332120230725033434.00-87609-517-1(CKB)2670000000185594(EBL)3137484(SSID)ssj0000658521(PQKBManifestationID)11414877(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000658521(PQKBWorkID)10691030(PQKB)11463539(MiAaPQ)EBC3137484(Au-PeEL)EBL3137484(CaPaEBR)ebr10554829(OCoLC)922997904(EXLCZ)99267000000018559420120106d2011 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSaudi Arabia in the New Middle East[electronic resource] /F. Gregory Gause IIINew York Council on Foreign Relations, Center for Preventive Actionc20111 online resource (64 p.)Council special report ;no. 63Description based upon print version of record.0-87609-516-3 ""Contents""; ""Foreword""; ""Acknowledgments""; ""Map""; ""Introduction""; ""Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia""; ""Saudi Regional Policy in the Wake of the Arab Upheaval""; ""Saudi-U.S. Relations""; ""Conclusion""; ""Endnotes""; ""About the Author""; ""Advisory Committee""; ""CPA Advisory Committee""; ""Mission Statement of the Center for Preventive Action""; ""Council Special Reports""The United States' relationship with Saudi Arabia has been one of the cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Middle East for decades. Despite their substantial differences in history, culture, and governance, the two countries have generally agreed on important political and economic issues and have often relied on each other to secure mutual aims. Their ongoing cooperation on maintaining regional stability, moderating the global oil market, and pursuing terrorists should not be downplayed. Yet for all the relationship's importance, it is increasingly imperiled by mistrust and misunderstanding. One major question is Saudi Arabia's stability. In this report, the author explores the foundations of Riyadh's present stability and potential sources of future unrest. It is difficult not to notice that Saudi Arabia avoided significant upheaval during the political uprisings that swept the Middle East in 2011, despite sharing many of the social and economic problems of Egypt, Yemen, and Libya. But unlike their counterparts in Cairo, Sanaa, and Tripoli, Riyadh's leadership was able to maintain order in large part by increasing public spending on housing and salaries, relying on loyal and well-equipped security forces, and utilizing its extensive patronage networks. The divisions within the political opposition also helped the government's cause. This is not to say that the stability of the House of Saud is assured. The author points out that the top heirs to the throne are elderly and the potential for disorderly squabbling may increase as a new generation enters the line of succession. Moreover, the population is growing quickly, and there is little reason to believe that oil will forever be able to buy social tranquility. Perhaps most important, the author argues, the leadership's response to the 2011 uprisings did little to forestall future crises; an opportunity for manageable political reform was mostly lost.CSR (New York, N.Y.) ;no. 63.International relationsHistory21st centurySaudi ArabiaPolitics and government21st centurySaudi ArabiaForeign relationsUnited StatesUnited StatesForeign relationsSaudi ArabiaInternational relationsHistory320.9538Gause F. Gregory1497272Council on Foreign Relations.Center for Preventive Action.MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910789907403321Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East3722325UNINA