02676nam 2200601 a 450 991078908940332120230617013901.03-11-032412-110.1515/9783110324129(CKB)3390000000032844(EBL)3042694(OCoLC)922945689(SSID)ssj0000801359(PQKBManifestationID)11488830(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000801359(PQKBWorkID)10773654(PQKB)10915370(MiAaPQ)EBC3042694(DE-B1597)211183(OCoLC)853254809(OCoLC)948656299(DE-B1597)9783110324129(Au-PeEL)EBL3042694(CaPaEBR)ebr10728835(EXLCZ)99339000000003284420130716d2004 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrHow can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective?[electronic resource] /Andrea ClausenFrankfurt ontos20041 online resource (268 p.)Logoj ;Bd. 6Description based upon print version of record.3-11-032383-4 Includes bibliographical references.pt. 1. The problem -- pt. 2. Critical discussion of proposed answers.In this book, Andrea Clausen intends to reconcile Kripke's point according to which conceptual content has to be considered as being constituted by social, normative practice - by a process of mutual assessments - with the view that the content of empirical assertions has to be conceived as objective. She criticizes approaches that explicate content-constitutive practice in non-normative terms, namely in terms of sanctioning behavior (Haugeland, Pettit, Esfeld). She also rejects a pragmatist reading of Heidegger that proceeds from thoroughly normative but pre-conceptual practice. She develops and defends a particular reading of an approach that conceives normative, conceptually articulated practice - giving and asking for reasons - as primitive (Brandom, McDowell).Logos (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ;Bd. 6.ConceptualismNormativity (Ethics)Conceptualism.Normativity (Ethics)Clausen Andrea1465858MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910789089403321How can conceptual content be social and normative, and, at the same time, be objective3676104UNINA