05596oam 22012014 450 991078871290332120230721033707.01-4623-7593-61-4527-5913-81-282-84469-597866128446901-4518-7427-8(CKB)3390000000010772(EBL)1606017(OCoLC)671571347(MiAaPQ)EBC1606017(IMF)WPIEE2009282(EXLCZ)99339000000001077220020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtrdacontentcrdamediacrrdacarrier“Lost Decade” in Translation - What Japan’s Crisis could Portend about Recovery from the Great Recession /Kiichi Tokuoka, Murtaza Syed, Kenneth KangWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (42 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Japan's Lost Decade: From Green Shoots to Enduring Recovery; A. Background: The Three Phases of Japan's Crisis; Phase 1: 1990-97-Crisis Outbreak and Fragile Recovery; Phase 2: 1997-2000-Systemic Stress and Second Recovery Attempt; Phase 3: 2001-03-Renewed Systemic Stress Followed by Sustained Recovery; B. Revisiting Japan's Policy Responses; The Primacy of Financial and Corporate Interventions; Re-assessing the Effectiveness of Fiscal Stimulus; The Supportive Role of Credit Easing; The Art of Disengagement: Exit Strategies and Long-Term ImpactsIII. Potential Implications for Today: Recovery from the Great RecessionA. The Outlook for the Global Recovery: Views from the Lost Decade; B. The Role for Global Policies: From Stimulus to Exit; IV. Conclusion; Appendix. A Chronology of Japan's Key Policy Actions; ReferencesIs the recovery from the global financial crisis now secured? A strikingly similar crisis that stalled Japan's growth miracle two decades ago could provide some clues. This paper explores the parallels and draws potential implications for the current global outlook and policies. Japan's experiences suggest four broad lessons. First, green shoots do not guarantee a recovery, implying a need to be cautious about the outlook. Second, financial fragilities can leave an economy vulnerable to adverse shocks and should be resolved for a durable recovery. Third, well-calibrated macroeconomic stimulus can facilitate this adjustment, but carries increasing costs. And fourth, while judging the best time to exit from policy support is difficult, clear medium-term plans may help.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/282Financial crisesJapanAccountingimfBanks and BankingimfFinance: GeneralimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfPublic FinanceimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPublic AdministrationimfPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfBankingimfFinancial reporting, financial statementsimfMonetary economicsimfFinanceimfPublic finance & taxationimfFinancial statementsimfCreditimfDistressed assetsimfPublic debtimfBanks and bankingimfFinance, PublicimfDebts, PublicimfJapanEconomic policyJapanimfFinancial crisesAccountingBanks and BankingFinance: GeneralMoney and Monetary PolicyPublic FinanceBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPublic AdministrationPublic Sector Accounting and AuditsMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtBankingFinancial reporting, financial statementsMonetary economicsFinancePublic finance & taxationFinancial statementsCreditDistressed assetsPublic debtBanks and bankingFinance, PublicDebts, PublicTokuoka Kiichi1476613Syed Murtaza1462061Kang Kenneth1563284International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788712903321“Lost Decade” in Translation - What Japan’s Crisis could Portend about Recovery from the Great Recession3831553UNINA