04693oam 22010334 450 991078841390332120230828232705.01-4623-5989-21-4527-1382-01-283-51390-097866138263501-4519-0905-5(CKB)3360000000443626(EBL)3014426(SSID)ssj0000940018(PQKBManifestationID)11600613(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000940018(PQKBWorkID)10956247(PQKB)11644071(OCoLC)694141073(MiAaPQ)EBC3014426(IMF)WPIEE2006111(EXLCZ)99336000000044362620020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrA Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China /Marvin Goodfriend, Eswar PrasadWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (52 p.)IMF Working Papers"May 2006."1-4518-6371-3 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW""; ""II. LOW INFLATION OBJECTIVE AS NOMINAL ANCHOR""; ""III. PRINCIPLES OF MONETARY POLICY GEARED TOWARD TARGETING INFLATION""; ""IV. INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY""; ""V. MONETARY AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN CHINA""; ""VI. INDEPENDENT MONETARY POLICY FOR CHINA""; ""VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""REFERENCES""As China's economy becomes more market based and continues its rapid integration into the global economy, having an independent and effective monetary policy regime oriented to domestic objectives will become increasingly important. Employing modern principles of monetary policy in light of the current state of China's financial institutions, we motivate and present a package of proposals to guide the operation of a new monetary policy regime. Specifically, we recommend an explicit low long-run inflation objective, operational independence for the People's Bank of China (PBC) with formal strategic guidance from the government, and a minimal set of financial sector reforms (to make the Chinese banking system robust against interest rate fluctuations). We argue that anchoring monetary policy with an explicit inflation objective would be the most reliable way for the PBC to tie down inflation expectations, and thereby enable monetary policy to make the best contribution to macroeconomic and financial stability, as well as economic growth. The management and monitoring of money (and credit) growth by the PBC would continue to play a useful role in the stabilization of inflation, but a money target would not constitute a good stand-alone nominal anchor.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/111Monetary policyChinaBanks and BankingimfInflationimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfMonetary PolicyimfBankingimfMacroeconomicsimfMonetary economicsimfCommercial banksimfInflation targetingimfMonetary policy frameworksimfBanks and bankingimfPricesimfMonetary policyimfChinaEconomic conditionsChina, People's Republic ofimfMonetary policyBanks and BankingInflationMoney and Monetary PolicyBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPrice LevelDeflationMonetary PolicyBankingMacroeconomicsMonetary economicsCommercial banksInflation targetingMonetary policy frameworksBanks and bankingPricesMonetary policyGoodfriend Marvin1546577Prasad Eswar124415International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788413903321A Framework for Independent Monetary Policy in China3802275UNINA