05541oam 22012494 450 991078841100332120230828232650.01-4623-4778-91-4519-9338-21-283-51351-X97866138259641-4519-0940-3(CKB)3360000000443588(EBL)3014442(SSID)ssj0000939916(PQKBManifestationID)11502257(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000939916(PQKBWorkID)10938658(PQKB)11541907(OCoLC)694141096(MiAaPQ)EBC3014442(IMF)WPIEE2006227(EXLCZ)99336000000044358820020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy : Survey of Models, Indicators, and Empirical Evidence /Bernard Laurens, Marco Arnone, Jean-François SegalottoWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (85 p.)IMF Working Papers"October 2006."1-4518-6487-6 Includes bibliographical references (p.79-85).""Contents""; ""I. INTRODUCTION TO INDICATORS OF CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY""; ""II. BASE INDICATORS OF DE JURE AUTONOMY""; ""III. SUBSEQUENT LITERATURE AND EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON BASE INDICATORS""; ""IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS""; ""Appendix I. Statistical Tables""; ""Appendix II. Summary of Base Indicators of De Jure Autonomy Robin Bade, Michael Parkin ( 1977).""; ""Appendix III. Summary of Base Indicators of De Facto Autonomy Alex Cukierman ( 1992).""; ""Appendix IV. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Jure Autonomy""; ""Appendix V. Summary of Empirical Studies on De Facto Autonomy""; ""REFERENCES""This paper presents a survey of the literature on the measurement of central bank autonomy. We distinguish inputs that constitute the building blocks in the literature, and the literature that builds on them. Issues including sensitivity analysis, robustness, and endogeneity are discussed. The review shows that empirical evidence regarding the beneficial effects of central bank autonomy is substantial, although some technical issues still remain for further research. In particular, central bank autonomy raises the issue of subjecting the monetary authorities to democratic control; this calls for additional research on the linkages between central bank autonomy and accountability and transparency. Additional empirical analysis on the relationship between the financial strength of the central bank and its de facto autonomy, and between its autonomy and financial stability, would also be desirable.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/227Banks and banking, CentralManagementEconometric modelsMonetary policyEconometric modelsInflationimfLaborimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public PolicyimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfCentral Banks and Their PoliciesimfMonetary PolicyimfPublic finance & taxationimfLabourimfincome economicsimfLegal support in revenue administrationimfPrice stabilizationimfWage bargainingimfGovernment debt managementimfPricesimfRevenue administrationimfPublic financial management (PFM)imfRevenueimfGovernment policyimfWagesimfDebts, PublicimfUnited StatesimfBanks and banking, CentralManagementEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.InflationLaborMacroeconomicsPublic FinancePrice LevelDeflationTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralWages, Compensation, and Labor Costs: Public PolicyDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtCentral Banks and Their PoliciesMonetary PolicyPublic finance & taxationLabourincome economicsLegal support in revenue administrationPrice stabilizationWage bargainingGovernment debt managementPricesRevenue administrationPublic financial management (PFM)RevenueGovernment policyWagesDebts, PublicLaurens Bernard1462077Arnone Marco120033Segalotto Jean-François1462076International Monetary Fund.Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788411003321The Measurement of Central Bank Autonomy3802246UNINA