04396oam 22011414 450 991078841090332120230828232603.01-4623-6291-51-4527-8242-31-282-64909-497866138229011-4519-0969-1(CKB)3360000000443323(EBL)3014343(SSID)ssj0000941195(PQKBManifestationID)11525486(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000941195(PQKBWorkID)10963488(PQKB)10054208(OCoLC)698585545(MiAaPQ)EBC3014343(IMF)WPIEE2006256(EXLCZ)99336000000044332320020129d2006 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrGoal-Independent Central Banks : Why Politicians Decide to Delegate /Christopher CroweWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2006.1 online resource (43 p.)IMF Working Papers"November 2006."1-4518-6516-3 Includes bibliographical references.""Contents""; ""I. Introduction""; ""II. The Model""; ""III. Predictions""; ""IV. Empirical Tests""; ""V. Case Studies""; ""VI. Conclusions""A motivation for central bank independence (CBI) is that policy delegation helps politicians manage diverse coalitions. This paper develops a model of coalition formation that predicts when delegation will occur. An analysis of policy preferences survey data and CBI indicators supports the predictions. Case studies, drawn from several countries' recent past and the nineteenth-century United States, provide further support. Finally, the model explains why the expected negative relationship between CBI and inflation is not empirically robust: endogenous selection biases the estimated effect towards zero. The data confirm this.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2006/256Banks and banking, CentralMonetary policyBanks and BankingimfInflationimfMacroeconomicsimfMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional ModelsimfSpatial ModelsimfTreatment Effect ModelsimfNoncooperative GamesimfModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfCentral Banks and Their PoliciesimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their DistributionsimfBankingimfCentral bank autonomyimfPersonal incomeimfPricesimfCentral banksimfNational accountsimfBanks and bankingimfIncomeimfSouth AfricaimfBanks and banking, Central.Monetary policy.Banks and BankingInflationMacroeconomicsMultiple or Simultaneous Equation Models: Cross-Sectional ModelsSpatial ModelsTreatment Effect ModelsNoncooperative GamesModels of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting BehaviorPrice LevelDeflationCentral Banks and Their PoliciesBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesPersonal Income, Wealth, and Their DistributionsBankingCentral bank autonomyPersonal incomePricesCentral banksNational accountsBanks and bankingIncomeCrowe Christopher868737DcWaIMFBOOK9910788410903321Goal-Independent Central Banks3802245UNINA