05718oam 22012734 450 991078834730332120230721045624.01-4623-6284-21-4527-0366-397866128425111-4518-7176-71-282-84251-X(CKB)3170000000055200(EBL)1608170(SSID)ssj0000943299(PQKBManifestationID)11524017(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943299(PQKBWorkID)10994227(PQKB)10731293(OCoLC)694140992(MiAaPQ)EBC1608170(IMF)WPIEE2009029(EXLCZ)99317000000005520020020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies : How Much is theprivate Sector Affected? /Christoph TrebeschWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (37 p.)IMF Working Papers"February 2009."1-4519-1612-4 Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature; A. Debt Crises and Private Sector Access to Credit; B. The Role of Cooperation and Policy Signals; III. Econometric Methodology; A. Previous Approaches; B. Estimated Model; C. Dependent Variable: Foreign Credit to the Private Sector; D. Measuring Crisis Episodes; IV. Data: The Index of Coerciveness; A. Composition of the Index; B. Coding of the Index; V. Estimation Issues: Controlling for Shocks, Politics and Fundamentals; VI. Discussion of Results; A. Main Results; B. Effects of Individual Coercive Policies; C. Robustness AnalysisVII. Concluding RemarksTables; 1. Emerging Market Countries Included in the Estimations; 2. List of Control Variables; 3. Effect of Aggressive Debt Policies on Total Amount Borrowed; 4. Default Effects and Aggressive Debt Policies During Default; 5. Effect of Individual Coercive Actions (9 Sub-Indicators); 6. Robustness Tests; ReferencesThis paper proposes a new empirical measure of cooperative versus conflictual crisis resolution following sovereign default and debt distress. The index of government coerciveness is presented as a proxy for excusable versus inexcusable default behaviour and used to evaluate the costs of default for the domestic private sector, in particular its access to international debt markets. Our findings indicate that unilateral, aggressive sovereign debt policies lead to a strong decline in corporate access to external finance (loans and bond issuance). We conclude that coercive government actions towards external creditors can have strong signalling effects with negative spillovers on domestic firms. "Good faith" debt renegotiations may be crucial to minimize the domestic costs of sovereign defaults.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/029Debts, PublicFiscal policyExports and ImportsimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfPublic FinanceimfInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsimfFinancing PolicyimfFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementimfCapital and Ownership StructureimfValue of FirmsimfGoodwillimfFinancial CrisesimfMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralimfDebtimfDebt ManagementimfSovereign DebtimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfInternational economicsimfMonetary economicsimfFinanceimfPublic finance & taxationimfFinancial crisesimfDebt defaultimfExternal debtimfCreditimfDebt restructuringimfMoneyimfPublic debtimfDebts, ExternalimfDebts, PublicimfUnited StatesimfDebts, Public.Fiscal policy.Exports and ImportsFinancial Risk ManagementMoney and Monetary PolicyPublic FinanceInternational Lending and Debt ProblemsFinancing PolicyFinancial Risk and Risk ManagementCapital and Ownership StructureValue of FirmsGoodwillFinancial CrisesMonetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit: GeneralDebtDebt ManagementSovereign DebtEconomic & financial crises & disastersInternational economicsMonetary economicsFinancePublic finance & taxationFinancial crisesDebt defaultExternal debtCreditDebt restructuringMoneyPublic debtDebts, ExternalDebts, PublicTrebesch Christoph873361International Monetary Fund.Monetary and Capital Markets Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788347303321The Cost of Aggressive Sovereign Debt Policies3716524UNINA