05171oam 22011054 450 991078833970332120230721045654.01-4623-3559-41-4527-5814-X97866128430371-4518-7230-51-282-84303-6(CKB)3170000000055216(EBL)1608208(SSID)ssj0001476990(PQKBManifestationID)11914269(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001476990(PQKBWorkID)11449384(PQKB)10384385(OCoLC)503190350(MiAaPQ)EBC1608208(IMF)WPIEE2009083(EXLCZ)99317000000005521620020129d2009 uf 0engtxtccrHold Your Nose and Vote : Why Do Some Democracies Tolerate Corruption? /Marco PaniWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (34 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4519-1665-5 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Relations with Previous Studies; III. A Model of Public Expenditure with Corruption; A. How ministers respond to corruption: honest and corrupt citizens; B. The political response of non-elected citizens; C. The choice between honest and corrupt candidates; IV. Voting on Law Enforcement; A. Law enforcement and policy choice; B. Deciding on law enforcement; V. Conclusions; Appendix: Proofs of Propositions; ReferencesThis paper analyses why corruption can persist for long periods in a democracy and inquires whether this can result from a well-informed rational choice of the citizens. By applying a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy, the paper analyzes how corruption distortsthe allocation of resources between public and private expenditure, altering the policy preferences of elected and nonelected citizens in opposite directions. The result is a reduction in real public expenditure and, if the median voter's demand for public goods is sufficiently elastic, a tax reduction. In this case, some citizens can indirectly benefit from corruption. The paper shows that, under this condition, if the citizens anticipate a shift in policy preferences in favor of higher public expenditure, they may support institutional arrangements that favor corruption (such as a weak enforcement of the law) in order to alter future policy decisions in their favor. This result complements the findings of other studies that have attributed the persistence of corruption in a democracyto some failure on the part of the voters or the electoral system. It also bears implications for developing effective anticorruption strategies and for redefining the role that can be played by the international community.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/083Political corruptionDemocracyBudgetingimfPublic FinanceimfTaxationimfPolitical EconomyimfCriminologyimfBureaucracyimfAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsimfCorruptionimfNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfNational BudgetimfBudget SystemsimfCorporate crimeimfwhite-collar crimeimfPublic finance & taxationimfPolitical economyimfBudgeting & financial managementimfExpenditureimfTax incentivesimfBudget planning and preparationimfExpenditures, PublicimfEconomicsimfBudgetimfItalyimfPolitical corruption.Democracy.BudgetingPublic FinanceTaxationPolitical EconomyCriminologyBureaucracyAdministrative Processes in Public OrganizationsCorruptionNational Government Expenditures and Related Policies: GeneralTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralNational BudgetBudget SystemsCorporate crimewhite-collar crimePublic finance & taxationPolitical economyBudgeting & financial managementExpenditureTax incentivesBudget planning and preparationExpenditures, PublicEconomicsBudgetPani Marco1493451DcWaIMFBOOK9910788339703321Hold Your Nose and Vote3716448UNINA