05529oam 22012134 450 991078833740332120230721045649.01-4623-5981-71-4527-8438-81-4518-7223-297866128429791-282-84297-8(CKB)3170000000055240(EBL)1608240(SSID)ssj0000943063(PQKBManifestationID)11503271(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943063(PQKBWorkID)10994196(PQKB)10205806(OCoLC)608248529(MiAaPQ)EBC1608240(IMF)WPIEE2009076(EXLCZ)99317000000005524020020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrSimple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules /Michael Kumhof, Douglas LaxtonWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (43 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4519-1658-2 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; I. Introduction; II. Literature Survey; III. The Model; A. Households; 1. Infinitely Lived Households; 2. Liquidity Constrained Households; B. Manufacturing; C. Copper Production; D. Distribution; E. Government; 1. Monetary Policy; 2. Fiscal Policy; F. Fiscal Policy Rules; 1. Chile's Structural Surplus Rule; 2. A Tax Revenue Gap Targeting Rule; 3. A Tax Revenue Gap Instrument Rule; G. Shocks; H. Equilibrium and Balance of Payments; I. Computation of Welfare; IV. Calibration; A. Steady State; B. Policy Rules, Adjustment Costs and Shocks; Tables; 1. Key Moments of the Data; V. ResultsA. Monetary RulesB. Impulse Responses; C. Welfare; D. Fiscal Instrument Volatility; E. Welfare - Fiscal Instrument Volatility Efficiency Frontiers; F. Macroeconomic Volatility; G. Other Real Activity Gaps?; H. Openness; I. Alternative Fiscal Instruments; VI. Conclusion; Figures; 1. IRF for Technology Shock; 2. IRF for Investment Shock; 3. IRF for Copper Demand Shock; 4. Welfare for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 5. Fiscal Instrument Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 6. Efficiency Frontiers; 7. Macroeconomic Volatility for Tax Revenue Gap Rule; 8. Openness; 9. Welfare and Fiscal Instruments10. Fiscal Volatility for Different Fiscal InstrumentsAppendices; 1. Optimality Conditions of the Model; 2. Welfare Computations; ReferencesThis paper analyzes the scope for systematic rules-based fiscal activism in open economies. Relative to a balanced budget rule, automatic stabilizers significantly improve welfare. But they minimize fiscal instrument volatility rather than business cycle volatility. A more aggressively countercyclical tax revenue gap rule increases welfare gains by around 50 percent, with only modest increases in fiscal instrument volatility. For raw materials revenue gaps the government should let automatic stabilizers work. The best fiscal instruments are targeted transfers, consumption taxes and labor taxes, or, if it enters private utility, government spending. The welfare gains are significantly lower for more open economies.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/076Fiscal policyEconomic policyInvestments: MetalsimfMacroeconomicsimfPublic FinanceimfFiscal PolicyimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfMacroeconomics: ConsumptionimfSavingimfWealthimfMetals and Metal ProductsimfCementimfGlassimfCeramicsimfLabor Economics: GeneralimfPublic finance & taxationimfInvestment & securitiesimfLabourimfincome economicsimfFiscal policyimfRevenue administrationimfConsumptionimfCopperimfLaborimfRevenueimfEconomicsimfLabor economicsimfChileimfFiscal policy.Economic policy.Investments: MetalsMacroeconomicsPublic FinanceFiscal PolicyTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralMacroeconomics: ConsumptionSavingWealthMetals and Metal ProductsCementGlassCeramicsLabor Economics: GeneralPublic finance & taxationInvestment & securitiesLabourincome economicsFiscal policyRevenue administrationConsumptionCopperLaborRevenueEconomicsLabor economicsKumhof Michael1472664Laxton Douglas1462103International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788337403321Simple, Implementable Fiscal Policy Rules3685579UNINA