05320oam 22011654 450 991078824600332120230721045613.01-4623-6690-21-4527-0267-51-4518-6957-61-282-84051-79786612840517(CKB)3170000000054995(EBL)1607825(SSID)ssj0000943964(PQKBManifestationID)11523999(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000943964(PQKBWorkID)10983189(PQKB)11180517(OCoLC)874176086(MiAaPQ)EBC1607825(IMF)WPIEE2008096(EXLCZ)99317000000005499520020129d2008 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrAccumulating Foreign Reserves Under Floating Exchange Rates /Fernando M. GonçalvesWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2008.1 online resource (43 p.)IMF Working PapersIMF working paper ;WP/08/96Description based upon print version of record.1-4519-1411-3 Includes bibliographical references.Contents; 1. Introduction; 2. Theoretical Model: Basic Set-up; 3. Complete Information; 3.1. Centralization; 3.2. Institutional Arrangements in Practice; 3.3. Separation; 3.4. Centralization versus Separation; 4. Incomplete Information; 4.1. Stage 1: Centralization versus Separation; Figures; 1. Timetable; 4.2. Stage 0: Centralization versus Separation; 5. Comparative Analysis Under Incomplete Information; 5.1. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 2. Simulation of Stage 0 Parameters; 5.2. The Trade-off Between Reserve Accumulation and Credibility Building; 5.3. Centralization versus Separation5.3.1. Macroeconomic Stability3. Macroeconomic Stability - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.2. Reserve Targeting; 4. Reserve Targeting - Centralization versus Separation; 5.3.3. Discussion; 6. Concluding Remarks; References; Appendix; Proof of Proposition 1; Proof of Corollary 1Official accumulation of foreign reserves may be perceived as interventions to influence the exchange rate, undermining the credibility of floating exchange rates and inflation targets. This paper develops a theoretical framework to study the interaction between reserve accumulation and monetary policy. The model uncovers a trade-off between the speed of reserve accumulation and anti-inflationary credibility. Under reasonable assumptions, delegation of intervention and monetary policy decisions to separate government agencies allows faster reserve accumulation, while centralization of these decisions results in a more stable economy. The analysis underscores the importance of rather overlooked institutional features of policymaking in open economies.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2008/096Foreign exchange ratesEconometric modelsBank reservesEconometric modelsMonetary policyEconometric modelsBanks and BankingimfForeign ExchangeimfInflationimfMoney and Monetary PolicyimfPublic FinanceimfMonetary PolicyimfPrice LevelimfDeflationimfTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralimfMonetary economicsimfMacroeconomicsimfBankingimfCurrencyimfForeign exchangeimfPublic finance & taxationimfInflation targetingimfReserves accumulationimfForeign exchange interventionimfInstitutional arrangements for revenue administrationimfMonetary policyimfPricesimfForeign exchange reservesimfRevenueimfForeign exchange ratesEconometric models.Bank reservesEconometric models.Monetary policyEconometric models.Banks and BankingForeign ExchangeInflationMoney and Monetary PolicyPublic FinanceMonetary PolicyPrice LevelDeflationTaxation, Subsidies, and Revenue: GeneralMonetary economicsMacroeconomicsBankingCurrencyForeign exchangePublic finance & taxationInflation targetingReserves accumulationForeign exchange interventionInstitutional arrangements for revenue administrationMonetary policyPricesForeign exchange reservesRevenue332.456Gonçalves Fernando M862010DcWaIMFBOOK9910788246003321Accumulating Foreign Reserves Under Floating Exchange Rates3673569UNINA