04584oam 22009374 450 991078822820332120230721045720.01-4623-8300-91-4527-5006-81-4518-7333-697866128439691-282-84396-6(CKB)3170000000055334(EBL)1608424(SSID)ssj0000942995(PQKBManifestationID)11566061(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000942995(PQKBWorkID)10994190(PQKB)11641521(OCoLC)527722840(MiAaPQ)EBC1608424(IMF)WPIEE2009186(EXLCZ)99317000000005533420020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrOne Money, One Market—A Revised Benchmark /Christian Henn, Theo EicherWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (25 p.)IMF Working Papers"September 2009."1-4519-1758-9 Contents; I. Introduction; II. Data; III. Empirical Implementation of the Gravity Model; IV. Multilateral Resistance and the Trade Effects of Currency Unions; V. Benchmark CU Trade Effects addressing Multilateral Resistance and Unobserved Bilateral Heterogeneity; VI. Sensitivity Analysis; VII. Conclusion; Tables; 1. Trade Effects of Currency Unions; 2. Sensitivity Analysis: Average Currency Union Effects on Trade; 3. Sensitivity Analysis: Trade Effects of Individual Currency Unions; Appendix Table; A1. Countries in Sample; A2. Membership and Observations for Currency Unions and BoardsA3. Membership in Preferential Trade AgreementsA4. Bilateral Preferential Trade Agreements; ReferencesThe introduction of the euro generated substantial interest in measuring the impact of currency unions (CUs) on trade flows. Rose's (2000) initial estimates suggested a tripling of trade and created a literature in search of "more reasonable" CU effects. A recent meta-analysis of this literature shows that subsequent papers quantify CU trade impacts at 30-90 percent. However, most recent studies use shorter time series and fewer countries than Rose in his original work. We revisit Rose's original benchmark, extend the dataset, and address Baldwin's (2006) critiques regarding the proper specification of gravity models in large panels by simultaneously accounting for multilateral resistance and unobserved bilateral heterogeneity. This produces a robust average CU trade effect of 45 percent. Yet, the trade impacts of individual CUs vary substantially and are generally lower than those of preferential trade agreements (PTAs). Our revised benchmark can be used as a yardstick for future studies to delineate how estimates differ due to new data or differences in econometric specifications.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/186Monetary unionsTariffFree tradeExports and ImportsimfForeign ExchangeimfTrade PolicyimfInternational Trade OrganizationsimfFinancial Aspects of Economic IntegrationimfInternational economicsimfCurrencyimfForeign exchangeimfPlurilateral tradeimfMonetary unionsimfExchange ratesimfMultilateral tradeimfInternational tradeimfUnited StatesimfMonetary unions.Tariff.Free trade.Exports and ImportsForeign ExchangeTrade PolicyInternational Trade OrganizationsFinancial Aspects of Economic IntegrationInternational economicsCurrencyForeign exchangePlurilateral tradeMonetary unionsExchange ratesMultilateral tradeInternational trade332.4566094Henn Christian1493519Eicher Theo1176252International Monetary Fund.Strategy, Policy, and Review Dept.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788228203321One Money, One Market—A Revised Benchmark3741586UNINA