05945oam 22012734 450 991078822190332120230721045721.01-4623-1136-91-4527-8335-71-4518-7417-01-282-84459-89786612844591(CKB)3170000000055401(EBL)1606008(SSID)ssj0001488803(PQKBManifestationID)11842765(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001488803(PQKBWorkID)11445561(PQKB)11063769(OCoLC)671571362(MiAaPQ)EBC1606008(IMF)WPIEE2009272(EXLCZ)99317000000005540120020129d2009 uf 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrWho Disciplines Bank Managers? /Andrea Maechler, Klaus Schaeck, Martin Cihak, Stéphanie Marie StolzWashington, D.C. :International Monetary Fund,2009.1 online resource (76 p.)IMF Working PapersDescription based upon print version of record.1-4519-1833-X Includes bibliographical references.Cover Page; Title Page; Copyright Page; Contents; I. Introduction; II. Related Literature and Hypothesis; III. Methodology and Data; A. Methodology; B. Variable Selection; C. Dataset; 1. Histogram of Total Assets; 1. Descriptive Statistics, Differences of Means and Medians, and Correlations; IV. Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; 2. Percentage Changes in Bank Performance Prior to Executive Turnover; V. Multivariate Analysis; 3. Conditional Logit Models for Different Sources of Discipine; 4. Key Variables of Interest by Percentile of Z-Score5. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment Group)6. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Treatment and Control Group); 7. Changes in Bank Performance After Executive Turnovers (Matching on Propensity Scores, Treatment, and Control Group; VI. Conclusions; I. Measuring Bank Soundness Using the Z-Score; II. Overview of Data and Sources; III. Turnovers in Small and Medium Sized U.S. Banks 1990-2007; IV. Robustness Checks; References; FootnotesWe bring to bear a hand-collected dataset of executive turnovers in U.S. banks to test the efficacy of market discipline in a 'laboratory setting' by analyzing banks that are less likely to be subject to government support. Specifically, we focus on a new face of market discipline: stakeholders' ability to fire an executive. Using conditional logit regressions to examine the roles of debtholders, shareholders, and regulators in removing executives, we present novel evidence that executives are more likely to be dismissed if their bank is risky, incurs losses, cuts dividends, has a high charter value, and holds high levels of subordinated debt. We only find limited evidence that forced turnovers improve bank performance.IMF Working Papers; Working Paper ;No. 2009/272Banks and bankingCorporate governanceBanks and BankingimfCorporate FinanceimfEconometricsimfFinance: GeneralimfFinancial Risk ManagementimfBanksimfDepository InstitutionsimfMicro Finance InstitutionsimfMortgagesimfGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationimfDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice ModelsimfDiscrete RegressorsimfProportionsimfFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationimfCorporate Finance and Governance: GeneralimfBankingimfFinanceimfEconometrics & economic statisticsimfEconomic & financial crises & disastersimfCorporate financeimfBank soundnessimfLogit modelsimfDeposit insuranceimfBanks and bankingimfEconometric modelsimfCrisis managementimfCorporations--FinanceimfUnited StatesimfBanks and banking.Corporate governance.Banks and BankingCorporate FinanceEconometricsFinance: GeneralFinancial Risk ManagementBanksDepository InstitutionsMicro Finance InstitutionsMortgagesGeneral Financial Markets: Government Policy and RegulationDiscrete Regression and Qualitative Choice ModelsDiscrete RegressorsProportionsFinancial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and RegulationCorporate Finance and Governance: GeneralBankingFinanceEconometrics & economic statisticsEconomic & financial crises & disastersCorporate financeBank soundnessLogit modelsDeposit insuranceBanks and bankingEconometric modelsCrisis managementCorporations--FinanceMaechler Andrea1493447Schaeck Klaus1509560Cihak Martin1106217Stolz Stéphanie Marie1485148International Monetary Fund.DcWaIMFBOOK9910788221903321Who Disciplines Bank Managers3741523UNINA