01004cam0-2200349---450-99000919460040332120110520110501.0978-88-8101-432-3000919460FED01000919460(Aleph)000919460FED0100091946020100607d2007----km-y0itay50------baitaITy-------001yy<<La >>tradizione dottrinale nel diritto ecclesiasticoMario TedeschiCosenzaPellegrinistampa 2007133 p.22 cmDiritto e religioni7Diritto ecclesiastico342.450 85221itaTedeschi,Mario<1944- >287357ITUNINARICAUNIMARCBK990009194600403321I F 2945605FSPBCII P 8 (7)52812*FGBCFGBCFSPBCTradizione dottrinale nel diritto ecclesiastico775493UNINA03008nam 2200613 450 991078772010332120230421055514.01-84788-180-71-4725-7800-7(CKB)2670000000518516(EBL)1609910(SSID)ssj0001113230(PQKBManifestationID)11661586(PQKBTitleCode)TC0001113230(PQKBWorkID)11166975(PQKB)10426046(MiAaPQ)EBC1609910(Au-PeEL)EBL1609910(CaPaEBR)ebr10954135(CaONFJC)MIL752319(OCoLC)893336348(EXLCZ)99267000000051851619940623d1994 uy| 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrThe silence of memory Armistice Day, 1919-1946 /Adrian GregoryOxford ;Providence, RI, USA :Berg,1994.1 online resource (470 p.)The Legacy of the Great WarDescription based upon print version of record.1-336-21033-8 0-85496-955-1 Includes bibliographical references (pages 228-239) and index.Cover Page; Halftitle Page; Title Page; Contents; Acknowledgements; Introduction; 1 Lest We Forget: The Invention and Reception of Armistice Day; 2 Unknown Soldiers: The Marginality of Veterans on 11 November; 3 And Men Like Flowers Are Cut: The Haig Poppy Appeal 1919-39; 4 The Undertones of War: Armistice Day in the Thirties; 5 The Irony of History: Armistice Day from Peace to War; 6 God Our Help: The Churches, Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday; 7 The Restoration of Tradition?; Conclusion; Selected Bibliography; Index; Imprint PageThis book examines how the British people came to terms with the massive trauma of the First World War. Although the literary memory of the war has often been discussed, little has been written on the public ceremonies on and around 11 November which dominated the public memory of the war in the inter-war years. This book aims to remedy the deficiency by showing the pre-eminence of Armistice Day, both in reflecting what people felt about the war and in shaping their memories of it. It shows that this memory was complex rather than simple and that it was continually contested. Finally it seeks Legacy of the Great War.Armistice Day (Great Britain)HistoryWorld War, 1914-1918Anniversaries, etcWorld War, 1914-1918Great BritainArmistice Day (Great Britain)History.World War, 1914-1918Anniversaries, etc.World War, 1914-1918940.4/39Gregory Adrian111345MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910787720103321The silence of memory3724409UNINA05224nam 2200745Ia 450 991049003110332120200520144314.00-19-160724-X0-19-152595-21-4356-3350-497866111453471-281-14534-3(CKB)2560000000294074(EBL)679556(OCoLC)712015956(SSID)ssj0000087030(PQKBManifestationID)11112484(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000087030(PQKBWorkID)10031073(PQKB)11140413(StDuBDS)EDZ0000074388(MiAaPQ)EBC679556(MiAaPQ)EBC7036820(Au-PeEL)EBL7036820(oapen)https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/70998(oapen)doab70998(OCoLC)1336404602(EXLCZ)99256000000029407420070613d2007 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrA game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation /Debraj RayOxford Oxford University Press20071 online resource (336 p.)The Lipsey lecturesDescription based upon print version of record.0-19-920795-X 0-19-170910-7 Includes bibliographical references and index.Contents; Preface; Chapter 1. Introduction; Part 1 The Setting; Chapter 2. Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Characteristic Functions and Cooperative Games; 2.3 Two Approaches to Coalition Formation; 2.4 Farsightedness; 2.5 Two Examples; 2.6 Negotiations: One-Time or Continuing?; Chapter 3. Coalitions, Cooperation and Noncooperation; 3.1 Definitions and Notation; 3.2 Coalitional Equilibrium; 3.3 Partition Functions; 3.4 Extensions; 3.5 Summary; Part 2 A Bargaining Approach To Coalition Formation; Chapter 4. Irreversible Agreements; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 A Model4.3 Equilibrium4.4 Rubinstein-Ståhl Bargaining; 4.5 Baron-Ferejohn Bargaining; 4.6 Summary; Chapter 5. Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games; 5.1 Symmetric Partition Functions; 5.2 An Algorithm; 5.3 Connecting the Algorithm to Equilibria; 5.4 A Remark on Nontransferable Payoffs; 5.5 Proofs; 5.6 Summary; Chapter 6. Applications; 6.1 Cournot Oligopoly; 6.2 Public Goods; 6.3 Proofs; 6.4 Summary; Chapter 7. Irreversible Agreements: The General Case; 7.1 Characteristic Functions and the Core; 7.2 Equilibrium Response Vectors; 7.3 No-Delay Equilibrium7.4 Condition M, Payoffs and Coalition Structure7.5 More on Efficiency; 7.6 Externalities Revisited; 7.7 Alternative Protocols; 7.8 Proofs; 7.9 Summary; Chapter 8. A Framework for Reversible Agreements; 8.1 An Example; 8.2 A Proposal-Based Model of Coalition Formation; 8.3 Binding Agreements; 8.4 Strategies and Equilibrium; 8.5 Absorption and Efficiency; 8.6 Summary; Chapter 9. Reversible Agreements Without Externalities; 9.1 Two Examples; 9.2 Benignness; 9.3 Absorption and Efficiency; 9.4 Proofs; 9.5 Summary; Chapter 10. Reversible Agreements With Externalities10.1 The Baseline Model for Three-Player Games10.2 The Baseline Model for Four or More Players; 10.3 Superadditive Games; 10.4 Upfront Transfers and the Failure of Efficiency; 10.5 Summary; Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation; Chapter 11. Blocking; 11.1 The Core Revisited; 11.2 Farsightedness in Blocking; 11.3 A First Pass at Farsightedness; 11.4 Externalities and Farsightedness; 11.5 Summary; Chapter 12. Irreversible Commitments; 12.1 Equilibrium Binding Agreements; 12.2 Farsightedness and Prediction; 12.3 Inefficiency; 12.4 An Application to Political Party Formation12.5 Beyond Nested Deviations12.6 Summary; Chapter 13. The Blocking Approach in Real Time; 13.1 Introduction; 13.2 An Informal Description; 13.3 A Process of Coalition Formation; 13.4 Deterministic Equilibrium Processes; 13.5 Stochastic Equilibrium Processes; 13.6 Proofs; 13.7 Summary; Chapter 14. Directions; 14.1 Coalition Formation Without Unanimity; 14.2 Equity Within Coalitions; 14.3 Coalition Formation With Deliberate Exit; 14.4 Overlapping Coalitions; 14.5 Networks; 14.6 Coalition Formation With Nonbinding Agreements; 14.7 Incomplete Information; 14.8 Nontransferable Utility14.9 Axiomatic ApproachesDrawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.Lipsey lectures.CoalitionsGame theoryCoalitions.Game theory.302.14302.1483.03bclRay Debraj118374MiAaPQMiAaPQMiAaPQBOOK9910490031103321A game-theoretic perspective on coalition formation2181488UNINA