03982oam 2200733Ia 450 991078617320332120190503073406.01-283-90640-60-262-31217-4(CKB)2670000000319474(EBL)3339551(SSID)ssj0000784105(PQKBManifestationID)11428817(PQKBTitleCode)TC0000784105(PQKBWorkID)10762271(PQKB)11037067(StDuBDS)EDZ0000130998(MiAaPQ)EBC3339551(OCoLC)822894365(MdBmJHUP)muse25866(OCoLC)822894365(OCoLC)960169173(OCoLC)961554498(OCoLC)962688455(OCoLC)990483682(OCoLC)1058175673(OCoLC-P)822894365(MaCbMITP)8858(Au-PeEL)EBL3339551(CaPaEBR)ebr10640073(CaONFJC)MIL421890(EXLCZ)99267000000031947420121224d2013 uy 0engur|n|---|||||txtccrRadicalizing enactivism basic minds without content /Daniel D. Hutto and Erik MyinCambridge, Mass. MIT Press©2013©20131 online resource (233 p.)Description based upon print version of record.0-262-01854-3 Includes bibliographical references and index.Contents; Preface; Acknowledgments; Abbreviations; Chapter 1: Enactivism; The Specter of Enactivism; Enactivism RECtified; CIC, REC, and CEC; A Walk on the Wild Side; Chapter 2: Enactivisms Less Radical; Other Enactivisms; Sensorimotor Enactivism; Autopoietic Enactivism; The Information-Processing Challenge; Chapter 3: The Reach of REC; Reckoning with REC; A Helping Hand; The Non-Standard Ploy: CIC Rescued?; Chapter 4: The Hard Problem of Content; Three in One Blow; Content-What Is It Good For?; The (Literal) Truth about Information; Enactivist Makeovers; Chapter 5: CIC's RetreatFalling Back to High GroundHyperintellectualism; Minimal Intellectualism; Maximally Minimal Intellectualism; Chapter 6: CIC's Last Stand; Once More unto the Breach; Operation Imagistic Cognition; Operation Perceptual Science; The Phenomenal Cavalry?; The Factual Cavalry?; Aftermath; Chapter 7: Extensive Minds; From Extended to Extensive; Parity-Motivated EMH; Complementarity-Motivated EMH; Partnering Basic Minds with Scaffolded Minds; Chapter 8: Regaining Consciousness; Conflations of Consciousness; Going Wide While Staying In; Impossible Problems and Real Solutions; Notes; References; IndexHutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.CognitionPhilosophyPhilosophy and cognitive sciencePhilosophy of mindCognitive scienceContent (Psychology)PHILOSOPHY/Philosophy of Mind/GeneralCOGNITIVE SCIENCES/GeneralCognitionPhilosophy.Philosophy and cognitive science.Philosophy of mind.Cognitive science.Content (Psychology)128/.2Hutto Daniel D1160657Myin Erik1481057OCoLC-POCoLC-PBOOK9910786173203321Radicalizing enactivism3697878UNINA